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Control over property is valuable in and of itself. Scholars have not fully recog-
nized or explored that straightforward premise, which has profound implica-
tions for the economic analysis of property rights. A party to a property
dispute may actually prefer liability-rule protection for an entitlement resting
with the other party to liability-rule protection for an entitlement resting with
her. This Article presents a novel economic model that determines the condi-
tions under which that is the case—by taking account of how parties value
control. The model suggests new opportunities for policymakers to resolve con-
flicts and to develop better information about property disputes through policy
experiments. The Article provides recommendations for implementing this
new approach and suggests applications in the areas of copyright, trademark,
patent, and privacy law.
Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 664
I. Control as a Distinct Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
A. Property Disputes Are About Both Compensation and
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
B. Decoupling Compensation from Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 670
C. Disfavoring Rule Four—Leaving an Arrow in the Quiver . . . 672
II. The Value of Control in Property Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 673
A. Standard Law and Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 674
1. Modeling Property Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 674
2. Transaction Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676
3. Externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 677
B. Incorporating the Value of Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 678
1. Utility over Compensation and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679
2. Disaggregating Harm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 683
3. Ranking the Initial Endowments Under Each Rule . . . . 684
4. Four Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 687
5. Conditions Under Which Owners Prefer Rule Four to
Rule Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 688
C. Anticipating Critiques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 690
1. Doubts About the Subjective Value of Control . . . . . . . 690
* Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to
thank David Dana, Erin Delaney, Zev Eigen, Lee Anne Fennell, Ezra Friedman, Wendy
Gordon, Kembrew McLeod, Bill Miller, Laura Pedraza-Farin˜a, Peggy Radin, Max
Schanzenbach, Dave Schwartz, Nadav Shoked, Jim Speta, and Matt Spitzer for helpful
comments, suggestions, and conversations. Shatra Bell, Nathan Brenner, and Justin Morgan
provided intrepid and insightful research assistance. All errors are my own responsibility.
663
664 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:663
2. Doubts About the Reciprocal Nature of Harm . . . . . . . . 691
3. Doubts About the Economic Analysis of Harm . . . . . . . 692
4. Doubts About the Separate Value of Control . . . . . . . . . 692
III. Implementing the Missing Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693
A. How Rule Four Could Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 694
1. Determining When to Deploy Rule Four . . . . . . . . . . . . . 694
2. Determining How to Deploy Rule Four . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 697
B. Obvious Problems and Design Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 699
1. Will the Government Get the Price Wrong? . . . . . . . . . . 699
2. Will Rule Four Lead to Extortion? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 700
3. Will Rule Four Create Unfair Advantages for Wealthy
Owners? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 701
4. How Can Rule Four Be Squared with Important
Rights? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702
C. Experiments with Rule Two and Rule Four . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703
IV. Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 705
A. Copyright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 705
B. Trademark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 707
C. Patent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 708
D. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 709
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 710
Introduction
Control over property—the power to decide whether a particular use of
a resource may occur—is valuable in and of itself. Process matters, not just
outcome. Although this is a straightforward premise, its implications for the
economic analysis of property rights have not been fully explored. This Arti-
cle takes the premise that control is valuable for its own sake—not just as a
means to obtain favorable outcomes—and models the full implications of
that premise. This analysis suggests that policymakers should seek to under-
stand the value that parties to a property dispute place on decisionmaking
authority and that they should look to a broader set of property regimes
than they currently do.1 In the right circumstances, this would create oppor-
tunities to reach more efficient and, perhaps, fairer compromises between
disputants.
The notion of subjective and idiosyncratic valuation is familiar in the
context of real property.2 People often place subjective values on their
1. By “property regimes,” I mean the choice between property rules and liability rules.
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972) (providing the foundational analysis
of the distinction).
2. See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94 Cornell L.
Rev. 1391, 1394–95 (2009) (using subjective valuations of land as a leading example of the
general phenomenon of subjective valuation); Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just
Compensation, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 239, 262–66 (2007) (describing, although later rejecting,
the appeal of subjective measures of value of real property in the context of takings).
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homes; the specific performance remedy in real property is designed to pro-
tect this subjective value.3 And when a taking occurs, controversy can result,
partly because many people believe that “just compensation” for a taking
does not adequately account for a homeowner’s subjective valuation.4 Users
of property, as opposed to owners, may also have subjective valuations. For
instance, the holder of a dominant estate might place idiosyncratic value on
an easement.5
This Article emphasizes that one important part of the subjective value
of property derives from having authority to decide how that property may
be used.6 Many property regimes afford either owners or users the power to
decide whether a transfer will take place. As Professor Fennell observes,
“there is arguably a deeper value associated with autonomy that is different
in kind” from the other components of subjective value, that is, the value of
enjoyment and the surplus value obtainable in trade.7 Control over property,
whether by the owner or the user, provides an opportunity to exercise au-
tonomy that is valuable in and of itself.
From this point of departure, the law and economics of property rules
and liability rules can be analyzed in a new way. Historically, liability-rule
protection for owners (Calabresi and Melamed’s “Rule Two”) has been com-
mon, while liability-rule protection for users (“Rule Four”) has been
thought quite unusual.8 Identifying the value of control raises the possibility
that owners might actually prefer Rule Four to Rule Two.9 Conversely, users
might prefer Rule Two to Rule Four. In other words, assuming entitlements
will be protected only by liability rules, parties to property disputes might
3. See Timothy J. Muris, Comment, The Costs of Freely Granting Specific Performance,
1982 Duke L.J. 1053, 1054–55 (acknowledging, in the course of criticizing the remedy, that the
goal of specific performance is “protecting subjective value”).
4. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005); see also Ilya Somin, The
Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2100, 2108 (2009)
(discussing the “widespread outrage” at the decision).
5. See, e.g., Sally Brown Richardson, Nonuse and Easements: Creating a Pliability Regime
of Private Eminent Domain, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2010) (discussing an example in which the
holders of a servient and dominant estate both have a “personal value” of an easement).
6. See Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of
Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 713, 723 (2008) (discussing the psychological value of exercising decisionmaking au-
thority over real property).
7. Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 967.
8. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1115–16 (numbering the rules); see also
James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in An-
other Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440, 444, 450–51 (1995) (discussing the rarity of Rule Four and
the prevalence of Rule Two).
9. One would expect that a party would rather have an entitlement to a particular use
of property than not. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1090 (discussing the choice of
entitlement as prior to the choice of how to protect that entitlement).
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well prefer for the other party to be entitled to a use.10 The parties’ prefer-
ences across rules depend on the value they place on control itself.
The possibility that either party might have this unorthodox preference
makes Rule Four more worthy of practical consideration as a policy tool. It
also presents an opportunity. If policymakers can identify circumstances in
which the two parties share a preference for Rule Two or Rule Four, that
shared preference could represent the best compromise. And for some dis-
putes, that preference will also be the best solution for society.
Part I explains control as a separate value from enjoyment or compensa-
tion from trade. Part II provides an original economic analysis of property
rules and liability rules that incorporates the value of control. Part III then
outlines some considerations relevant to implementing Rule Four, including
critiques, potential responses, and the possibility of using liability rules for
experimental policy analysis. Part IV discusses four specific areas in which
policymakers could apply Rule Four more widely: copyright, trademark,
patent, and privacy law. The Article concludes with a discussion of avenues
for future research.
I. Control as a Distinct Value
This Part first explains the value of control and distinguishes it from the
value of deriving enjoyment from or receiving compensation for a particular
use of property. Next, I briefly summarize Calabresi and Melamed’s frame-
work, which contrasts property rules and liability rules as methods for pro-
tecting entitlements. For my purposes, the central insight of their famous
article is the decoupling of compensation and control that a liability rule
effects. In the third and final Section, I discuss the relative infrequency with
which Rule Four has been used.
A. Property Disputes Are About Both Compensation and Control
A person can value property ownership for two kinds of reasons.11 The
first kind is based on outcomes, such as enjoyment of the property or finan-
cial benefits from its sale or licensing.12 For shorthand, I refer to all these
10. If considering all possible property regimes, not just those featuring liability rules,
most parties will favor having the entitlement and having it protected with a property rule. See
Krier & Schwab, supra note 8, at 450–51 (discussing pragmatic differences between property
and liability rules).
11. The economic and expressive differences between tangible and intangible goods may
require special attention, but for the most part my analysis will apply to both. On the perils of
making an easy equivalence between real and intellectual property, see James Boyle, The
Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind 83–121 (2008) (using a vivid alle-
gory to explore the limitations of analogies to real property in intellectual property law).
12. The economic argument that connects property rights to compensation is that exclu-
sive rights give the rights holder an enforcement tool against would-be infringers that deters
enough infringement to allow the rights holder to earn an economic profit. See generally Har-
old Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347 (1967). In theory,
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outcome-based goods under the umbrella term compensation.13 The second
kind of value is procedural, relating to the ability to make autonomous deci-
sions about how others use the property in question. I refer to this kind of
good as control.14
For some people, in some situations, these two categories collapse into
one: the point of controlling use of the property is to earn compensation.
Having the right to restrict or delay how and when others use the property
can generate or maintain scarcity that garners more compensation for a
rights holder in the long run.
But money is not always the underlying motivation for valuing control.
Some individuals value control over uses of property at least partly for the
sake of control itself. Owners of real property, for example, value decision-
making power over how others may use their land.15 Users of real property
place an opposing but similar value on control. For a person experiencing a
nuisance from activity conducted on a neighbor’s land, the freedom to prac-
tice one’s profession in a certain location is at stake—not just money.16
Many creators of intellectual property view their work as an extension of
their personalities or identities, which can lead them to place subjective and
idiosyncratic value on controlling uses of their works.17 Control can matter
even when the owners of intellectual property rights are not the original
this amount of profit works as an incentive for parties organized by the rights holder to ex-
pend whatever labor and capital are required to create, market, and distribute the work. Id. at
356.
13. The idea of using compensation as an umbrella term is that compensation, here
meaning outcome-based value, can be taken in kind as enjoyment or taken as the surplus from
trades (sales or licenses).
14. In terms of Professor Morris’s four-component model of the value of entitlements,
my use of the term “control” corresponds to Morris’s term “veto power.” See Madeline Morris,
The Structure of Entitlements, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 822, 833–40 (1993).
15. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership,
51 Vand. L. Rev. 1541, 1545 (1998) (“In losing the right to an injunctive remedy, the plaintiffs
[in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970)] lost something more than
leverage in their negotiations with Atlantic Cement, and lost something distinct from an at-
tachment to their homes; they lost the power to refuse to sell their rights to the quiet enjoy-
ment of their property.”).
16. Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] 11 Ch.D. 852 (Eng.); see also Laura S. Underkuffler,
Teaching Property Stories, 55 J. Legal Educ. 152, 154 (2005) (citing A.W. Brian Simpson, The
Story of Sturges v. Bridgman: The Resolution of Land Use Disputes Between Neighbors, in Prop-
erty Stories 9 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 1st ed. 2004)) (“Neither Sturges
nor Bridgman wished to move his business.”).
17. There is an extensive literature on moral rights and the Lockean, Hegelian, or Kant-
ian justifications for them. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77
Geo. L.J. 287, 330–50 (1988) (discussing the Hegelian, personality-based view of intellectual
property); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the
Artistic Soul, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1945, 1975–77 (2006) (describing autonomy as one
aspect of the civil-law tradition of protecting creators’ moral rights); Kim Treiger-Bar-Am,
Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1059,
1075–76 (2008) (discussing Kant’s view of autonomy as related to choice).
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creators.18 Users of intellectual property also have an interest in control.
Downstream creators19 value the creative freedom to make use of existing
works as a form of personal autonomy, independent of the financial gain
from selling the new works.20 Consumers value the freedoms to read, to
listen, or to watch, such as the privilege to record a television show and
watch it later.21 Such freedoms sometimes allow consumers to avoid
purchasing copies, providing value that falls within the category of compen-
sation. But control over one’s own viewing—outside the strictures of licens-
ing and permissions—is a separate reason to value user rights.22
Several examples of intellectual property disputes suggest circumstances
in which a desire for control might accompany—or even supersede—a de-
sire for compensation. A musician may wish to prevent a politician whom
he does not support from playing his song at a public rally.23 A small-busi-
ness owner may want to block the use of his company’s brand name, even if
used in a totally different geographic region.24 A photographer may object to
18. When the owner is not the original creator—that is, when the owner is an intermedi-
ary like a publisher, studio, or record label—the managers and employees of that intermediary
may value control separately from compensation. Cf. Bruce Haring, Beyond the Charts:
MP3 and the Digital Music Revolution 85 (2000) (quoting a record-industry representa-
tive, Recording Industry Association of America CEO Hilary Rosen, speaking in terms of con-
trol). Moreover, in some situations in which an intermediary owns the intellectual property,
the creator retains a contractual right to veto certain types of licenses. See Kembrew McLeod
& Peter DiCola, Creative License: The Law and Culture of Digital Sampling 171, 232
(2011) (providing an example of the right to veto sample licenses and discussing the general
phenomenon within the recording industry).
19. In this terminology, the upstream creator is the creator of the preexisting work, and
the downstream creator is the creator of a derivative work, such as a remix or mash-up.
20. “[I]ndividual autonomy includes the freedom to interact in an active way with ex-
isting cultural materials, to recreate and reshape them, and to express one’s own voice through
a dialogue with those of others.” Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law on Its Head? The Goog-
lization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1799, 1847 (2007). For an
illustration of this in the context of the digital sampling of music, see McLeod & DiCola,
supra note 18, at 7–8.
21. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447–56 (1984)
(holding that unauthorized “time-shifting” is fair use).
22. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1871, 1908 (2007) (describ-
ing personal uses of copyrighted works as “historic liberties”); see also Julie E. Cohen, The
Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 347, 370–72 (2005) (“[T]he range of
practices subsumed under the label ‘copying’—including but not limited to duplication, imita-
tion, performance, and allusion—are critically important means of expressing one’s beliefs,
values, and affiliations.”).
23. See Matthew J. Cursio, Comment, Born to Be Used in the USA: An Alternative Avenue
for Evaluating Politicians’ Unauthorized Use of Original Musical Performances on the Campaign
Trail, 18 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 317, 318 (2011) (relating the story of Bruce Springsteen’s
objection to the use of his song “Born in the U.S.A.” by President Reagan’s reelection
campaign).
24. See, e.g., Competing for the Most Creative Beer Names, Here & Now (July 10, 2013),
http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2013/07/10/creative-beer-names (describing how Sixpoint Brew-
ery in Brooklyn asserted trademark rights in the name “Righteous” for a rye IPA).
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a visual artist’s incorporating his photographs into collages that the photog-
rapher perceives as denigrating the solemnity of his work about a religious
community.25 A novelist may act to squelch attempts to use characters from
her books in unauthorized sequels.26
These examples can be reversed to show how users of intellectual prop-
erty may also place value on control—for them, the freedom to engage in a
particular use. A politician may want the power to choose a song to express
a point about his political or social views.27 A small-business owner may
have his heart set on a name close to the name another business already
uses.28 A visual artist may feel that a photograph is instrumental within a
collage he has assembled.29 A writer may want to continue her favorite char-
acter’s story and take it in a radical or critical new direction.30
Each owner and user in those situations may have pecuniary interests,
whether in earning money from his or her own creations or in avoiding
licensing fees. But these examples evoke the importance of considering the
value of control separately from these pecuniary interests. Both property
owners and users often desire control for its own sake.31 Given the compet-
ing interests of owners and users, the law must decide which claims of con-
trol are legitimate and which claims are problematic. In situations where one
party highly values control, even an offer of financial compensation may not
satisfy that party.
25. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013) (describing the views of
the plaintiff, photographer Patrick Cariou, in favor of classical art and against pop art in
reference to his photographs of Rastafarians).
26. See, e.g., Anne Rice, Anne’s Messages to Fans, AnneRice.com, http://www.annerice
.com/ReaderInteraction-MessagesToFans.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (“I do not allow fan
fiction. The characters are copyrighted. It upsets me terribly to even think about fan fiction
with my characters.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
27. E.g., Cursio, supra note 23, at 318 n.8 (explaining President Reagan’s motivation for
using Springsteen’s song).
28. E.g., Competing for the Most Creative Beer Names, supra note 24 (describing the dis-
appointment of the owner of Renegade Brewing in Denver when giving up the name Rye-
teous for a rye IPA).
29. E.g., Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707 (describing artist Richard Prince’s motivation to use
Cariou’s photographs in collages that comment on musical culture).
30. See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural
Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 597, 599–600 (2007) (describ-
ing fan fiction authorship as an empowering way to combat stereotypes and social hierarchy);
Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 Loy. L.A.
Ent. L.J. 651, 657–58 (1997) (describing how authors of fan fiction assert their right to create
and deny that authors can control interpretations, sequels, and retellings).
31. Many owners and users believe that the law does in fact vindicate their interest in
control on their behalf. Scholars and policymakers must therefore tangle with two crucial facts
about owners and users of property: the normative desire (seeing control as a good) and the
descriptive position (thinking they have control). In other words, resolving disputes requires
understanding all the parameters of those disputes, including the parties’ valuations of control
for its own sake. See infra Part II (discussing policy implications based on the goal of dispute
resolution).
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The fact that both owners and users place a separate value on control
does not imply that their valuations will be symmetric. Nor does it imply
that society should treat owners’ and users’ interests as equally valid. In any
property or intellectual property dispute, one side’s claim to control may be
more appealing than the other’s—or even constitutionally required.32 My
claim is rather that each party to a property dispute may value autonomy for
its own sake. I want to emphasize that control is at stake in property dis-
putes, and not just as a means to secure enjoyment or gains from trade.
Private and public law reflect this distinction between compensation
and control. In many governmental allocations, property owners routinely
receive some compensation and some control as a result of their entitle-
ments.33 Similarly, in many property transactions, property owners receive
some compensation but retain some control over the resource being trans-
ferred.34 Thus, to describe the world more realistically, it will be advanta-
geous to view the value of particular uses of property in terms of two
separate goods: compensation and control.
B. Decoupling Compensation from Control
After modeling owners’ and users’ valuations in terms of compensation
and control, the next step in the argument is to consider the assignment,
design, and enforcement of entitlements. An entitlement is a right to enjoy a
resource or good, such as a particular use of property, and a right to prevent
others from doing so.35
In their famous article, Calabresi and Melamed focus on two methods of
protecting entitlements: property rules and liability rules.36 Property-rule
protection, in brief, means that the entitlement holder has control over the
resource and may demand his or her own price, or even refuse to sell.37
32. For example, fan fiction and appropriation art will often qualify as fair uses. A vi-
brant fair-use doctrine may be constitutionally necessary to avoid conflict between copyright
and free speech. See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copy-
right After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1082 (2013).
33. This is the case whenever the government grants an entitlement and protects it with
a property rule. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1115–16. The owner of such a
property right may enjoy the proceeds from the land as well as decisionmaking authority—the
property right cannot be transferred without her permission.
34. This occurs, for example, whenever real property is transferred with the encum-
brance of a servitude. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 Geo. L.J. 885,
900–01 (2008) (describing how servitudes present “the problem of the future” when land is
conveyed subject to them).
35. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1090 (describing entitlements in terms of
“access to goods, services, and life itself”); see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property
Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 723 (1996) (discuss-
ing “the entitlement to be free from harm”).
36. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1. Calabresi and Melamed do identify another
way of protecting entitlements: inalienability. Id. at 1111. But their article—as well as mine—
focuses on the other two methods.
37. Id. at 1092.
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Liability-rule protection, by contrast, means that the entitlement holder has
only a right to governmentally determined compensation if others use the
good to which he or she is entitled.38
Using this distinction between property rules and liability rules, Cala-
bresi and Melamed describe four broad types of property regimes or, in
their terminology, rules.39 Rule One (injunctive relief for the property
owner) and Rule Three (an exception, limitation, or defense for the user) are
frequently employed in both property law and intellectual property law.40
These two property rules put both compensation and control in the same
hands: either those of the property owner or those of the property user.
Meanwhile, Rule Two represents liability-rule protection: that is, money
damages alone, for the property owner. This rule arises in many contexts as
well.41 Rule Two gives the property owner a right to compensation for a
particular use of her property but denies her the decisionmaking authority
to block uses. Accordingly, any user has the option to make a use of the
property (within the confines of a governmental definition of the uses to
which Rule Two applies) as long as she pays the statutorily or judicially cho-
sen price. Rule Two decouples compensation and control. It denies the prop-
erty owner control, which is a significant reason why intellectual property
owners vehemently oppose compulsory licenses42 and why statutory licenses
are sometimes imposed in recognition of property owners’ bad behavior.43
Rule Four, by contrast, means something unusual in property law—
liability-rule protection for the user. Like Rule Two, Rule Four decouples
compensation and control. Under Rule Four, the user would have the base-
line entitlement, but the intellectual property owner would have an option
to pay the user a statutorily or judicially determined price to block the use.44
In simpler terms, the user would receive compensation, but the owner
would have control.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1115–16.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. See Robert Stephen Lee, An Economic Analysis of Compulsory Licensing in Copyright
Law, 5 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 203, 208–09 (1982) (describing the music publishers’ long his-
tory of opposing compulsory licensing).
43. See, e.g., Peter DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copy-
right Policy, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 173, 198–203 (2012) (discussing the imposition of compul-
sory licenses on sheet-music copyright owners who refused to license all but one of the player
piano roll companies).
44. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1116–18; see also Dotan Oliar, The Copy-
right-Innovation Tradeoff: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64
Stan. L. Rev. 951, 989–93 (2012) (discussing how Rule Four would operate and the incentives
it would give the parties to a copyright dispute).
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C. Disfavoring Rule Four—Leaving an Arrow in the Quiver
Rule Four, however, has been employed much less frequently than Rule
Two in real property.45 It is absent from intellectual property law.46 This
presents a long-standing puzzle as to why Rule Four has gone missing. Cala-
bresi and Melamed, for their part, invited readers to notice the absence of
Rule Four in the common law.47 In this Article, I urge scholars and policy-
makers to notice again that property law—intellectual property law in par-
ticular—rarely employs Rule Four. And the question becomes, Why not?
Some commentators disfavor liability rules in general, finding them un-
necessary or preferring market prices to government-set prices.48 Rule Four
in particular raises concerns about transaction costs when the dispute in-
volves one owner but many users.49 (The property disputes that I focus on in
this Article involve one owner and one user.) Rule Four also raises concerns
about extortion, because users might “come to the nuisance” and hope to
get paid off.50 Rule Four could give an advantage to wealthier owners at the
direct expense of users and at the indirect expense of less wealthy owners.51
In some applications, Rule Four seems to interfere with important rights.52
More than anything, Rule Four may seem undesirable only because it is
unfamiliar.53
Despite the counterintuitive nature of Rule Four and its attendant
problems, this Article suggests that the rule has some practical appeal. If
compensation and control are separately valued goods, and if property own-
ers vary in their preferences, then there will be some instances in which
property owners actually prefer Rule Four to Rule Two. Such owners would
be those who value control relatively highly. Similarly, there may also be
disputes in which the corresponding property users prefer Rule Four to Rule
45. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
46. See Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property in the Cathedral, in Access to Information
and Knowledge: 21st Century Challenges in Intellectual Property and Knowledge
Governance 95, 101 (Dana Beldiman ed., 2013) (“There has been little consideration as to
how such a rule might play out in intellectual property, rather than real property.”); cf. Mc-
Leod & DiCola, supra note 18, at 261–66 (performing the thought experiment of applying
Rule Four in the context of sample licensing in the music industry but acknowledging the
unfamiliarity of the rule).
47. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1116 (“Missing is a fourth rule . . . .”). This
was soon to be remedied by the nearly contemporaneous decision in Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del
E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972). For a discussion of this intellectual
history, see Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of
Liability Rules, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2001) (“As fate would have it, the fourth box would not
stay empty long.”).
48. See infra Section III.B.1.
49. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1116–17; see also Krier & Schwab, supra
note 8, at 450.
50. See infra Section III.B.2.
51. See infra Section III.B.3.
52. See infra Section III.B.4.
53. See infra Section III.B.1.
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Two. Such users would be those who value compensation relatively highly.
The converse is also true; there can be situations in which both parties prefer
Rule Two to Rule Four.
Now suppose that, in some circumstances, the two property rules (Rules
One and Three) are either undesirable or unworkable. When that occurs,
and when the parties agree in their preference for one of the two liability
rules—the two policy options that remain on the table—policymakers
should strongly consider adopting the jointly preferred liability rule as the
property regime.54 While other factors could recommend a different re-
gime,55 policymakers should take advantage of situations in which one party
to the property dispute tends to value control relatively highly and the other
party tends to value compensation relatively highly. Such situations re-
present opportunities to reach an acceptable compromise among the parties
and to benefit society by resolving disputes more fairly and efficiently.
Much of the law-and-economics literature about property disputes has
compared property rules and liability rules from the perspective of social
efficiency.56 My Article focuses instead on comparing the two liability rules
from the perspective of the parties. This new focus illuminates a possible
path to social efficiency.
I do not mean to contend that Rule Four should necessarily apply very
often. Without empirical evidence, policymakers cannot know how often
parties to a particular type of property dispute have the same liability-rule
preference.57 And the property rules may only seldom be discarded as unde-
sirable options. Instead, my argument is that policymakers should seek
targeted opportunities to deploy Rule Four. The absence of this rule from
intellectual property law has unnecessarily limited the policy space, and this
absence has also clouded scholars’ and policymakers’ collective understand-
ing of the values of compensation and control.
II. The Value of Control in Property Disputes
This Part briefly recounts the standard law-and-economics account of
property rules and liability rules. It then modifies this standard account by
treating as distinct the values of compensation and control. This Part con-
cludes by addressing critiques of my new approach.
This Article examines disputes over particular uses of property—such as
real estate, an invention, an expressive work, or a brand name. For simplic-
ity, I will refer to a single owner of a tangible or intangible resource as the
owner. This individual or entity may or may not end up receiving property
rights over the use in question. In other words, owner is shorthand for
54. See infra Section II.B.5.
55. One reason that could tip the scales the other way, against the shared preference of
the parties, would be externalities on third parties to the dispute. See infra Section III.A.1.
56. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 35; Krier
& Schwab, supra note 8.
57. See infra Section III.C (suggesting how policymakers can use experiments to begin
collecting such information).
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“owner with some rights over some resource, one whose rights may or may
not extend to the disputed use.” On the other side of the dispute, I will refer
to a potential user of that good simply as the user rather than the potential
user or the “person who wants to use the resource in a particular way.”
The model in this Article assumes that the potential for harm when a
prospective user wishes to use a tangible or intangible resource is properly
viewed as reciprocal. Professor Coase argued that the harms from nui-
sance—a property tort—are reciprocal.58 In Coase’s view, the victims of
(what the law classifies as) a nuisance might experience harm, but the perpe-
trator of the alleged nuisance would also experience harm from being forced
to forgo the activity that results in a nuisance. That the harm is reciprocal
does not mean it is symmetrical; one side may experience more harm than
the other. But Coase’s point was that it may well be efficient to allow activi-
ties classified as nuisances—and, in a utilitarian sense, it would be more
ethical to allow them rather than disallow them. One may question whether
disputes over uses of intellectual property in particular are properly viewed
as situations in which either side would be legitimately harmed if the dispute
were not resolved in that side’s favor. I take up that objection below.59
A. Standard Law and Economics
When a property dispute occurs, one way to approach the problem is to
work backwards from the desired resolution to determine what incentives
the law should give the parties to encourage them to reach the socially desir-
able outcome.60 The ideal outcome varies based on the situation. Conflict
can center on whether a use is allowed or on the terms of a potential agree-
ment to allow the use. Sometimes, we want owners and users to negotiate a
license. Other times, we want the user to engage in the use without negotia-
tion. Still other times, we want the user to be deterred from engaging in a
use without negotiation. We also want the law to be sufficiently flexible such
that, when the background policy is mistaken or simply inappropriate in
that particular instance, parties pushed toward an inefficient outcome can
reach the efficient outcome instead. Therefore, it is important to set the de-
fault rules properly. We want to allocate property rights to encourage an
agreement, but we also must be prepared to live with the default rule if
parties do not reach such an agreement.
1. Modeling Property Disputes
Start with the simplest case and the strongest assumptions. Assume per-
fect information, no externalities, no transaction costs, and no value on con-
trol independent of compensation. Suppose the property owner expects a
future profit of 100 units if the disputed use does not occur. And assume
58. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 2 (1960).
59. See infra Section II.C.2.
60. See, e.g., Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists 57–61 (1992)
(explaining the methodology of backward induction).
March 2015] Valuing Control 675
that the owner expects that the profit will drop to 50 units if the use does
occur.61
Now suppose that the user’s product will not exist if the user cannot use
the owner’s property. If the user can generate 60 units in expected profits by
engaging in the disputed use, the use is socially efficient. The owner’s lost
profits of 50 units are more than accounted for by the user’s new profits. If
the user can generate only 40 units in expected profits, however, it is not
socially efficient.
The assumption of no externalities means that we can focus only on the
profits of each party as an isolated dyad. Among other things, this means
that there is no difference in consumer surplus between outcomes. The con-
sumer surplus that the potential customers of each party would experience is
external to the party’s decisions.62
The assumption of no transaction costs means that the parties can
achieve the efficient result through a private transaction.63 The assignment
of rights affects the distribution of wealth, but the parties will bargain to the
efficient result.64 For example, suppose the entitlement goes to the user, but
the use is worth only 40 units. The owner will pay between 40 and 50 units
to block the use. How the parties split the surplus depends on one’s assump-
tions about the bargaining process, but with no transaction costs the deal
happens.
61. This does not deal with situations in which the drop renders the owner’s investment
in the property unprofitable overall, that is, situations in which the owner’s fixed costs of
investment would not be recouped. By assumption, then, the property owner in the example
would still invest in using the property productively. But if that profit stream were instead
negative, the owner would not. See Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of
Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. Econ. 20, 22–25 (1995) (modeling this type of
inefficiency). For purposes of this Article, I leave this complication aside.
62. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 257,
273–74 (2007) (explaining that consumer surplus is external to contracts between intellectual
property owners and users). Note that consumer surplus is not an externality—and is in fact
very much internal—to the sales transactions between owners and their consumers or between
users and their consumers.
63. The concept of efficiency that applies consistently in the standard law-and-economics
model is Kaldor–Hicks efficiency. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
14–17 (9th ed. 2014) (defining Kaldor–Hicks efficiency as maximizing wealth across parties).
Under the stated assumptions, the resource will go to the party that values it most. Thus, the
result maximizes wealth among the parties. The allocation may also be Pareto efficient, but
this depends on the particular circumstances—that is, each party’s initial and final allocation.
See id. at 14 (“A Pareto-superior transaction (or ‘Pareto improvement’) is one that makes at
least one person better off and no one worse off.”).
64. Coase presented this insight in the context of nuisance law. See Coase, supra note 58,
at 10 (“With costless market transactions, the decision of the courts concerning liability for
damage would be without effect on the allocation of resources.”). His ultimate project was to
analyze situations with costly transactions. See id. at 15.
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2. Transaction Costs
Now add a simple transaction cost to account for the time, effort, and
resources necessary to engage in bargaining. There is still no private infor-
mation, externalities, or idiosyncratic value of control.
Under these circumstances, the worry arises that bargaining will not oc-
cur. It matters a lot who gets the initial entitlement, since the entitlement is
more likely to stay with that party, even when it would be efficient for the
resource to change hands. Adding transaction costs to the model means lia-
bility rules may have appeal in certain contexts.
Calabresi and Melamed’s analysis, especially as later explicated by
Professors Krier and Schwab, suggests that dealing with this problem re-
quires determining which institution will be better at assessing the relative
valuations—the government or “the market” (that is, the two private par-
ties: the owner and the user).65 This kind of comparative institutional analy-
sis serves as a central tool of law and economics.
Now suppose that the parties know their own expected valuations under
each outcome, but these valuations are not common knowledge. Moreover,
suppose the government does not know the parties’ valuations. There are
still no externalities and no idiosyncratic value on control. Private informa-
tion is a specific kind of transaction cost, with implications that can alter
which property regime is optimal.
Scholars typically treat the private-information issue more as a problem
of costly information: one could expend resources to acquire the informa-
tion. But there is also a strategic problem with private information. Each
party would have a strong incentive to overstate its own valuations in any
negotiation.66 Professors Ayres and Talley adopt a more game-theoretic per-
spective than the prior literature, asking what institutions can be used to
induce parties to reveal information truthfully.67 With private information,
there is uncertainty for the parties and the government. To capture these
groups’ information and beliefs, policymakers can only posit a distribution
of the valuations. In other words, policymakers will specify a range of possi-
ble valuations and place probabilities on each one.
It is helpful to reframe the parties’ valuations in terms of the contested
resource. We said before, with certainty, that the owner values non-use at 50
units (100 minus 50). Now suppose that the owner knows its own valuation,
but others can perceive only that there is a distribution from 0 to 100 units,
65. A major transaction cost that concerns these authors is having multiple parties on
one side of the dispute, which would generate coordination and holdout problems, as well as
other problems. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1119–22; Krier & Schwab, supra
note 8, at 460–62. Those issues, however, are not the focus of this Article.
66. For an introduction to mechanism design, which deals with problems of truthful
revelation of information, see Andreu Mas-Colell et al., Microeconomic Theory 857–83
(1995).
67. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facili-
tate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027, 1039–47 (1995).
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with equal probability on each value. (This is known as a uniform
distribution.)
We said before that the user’s valuation was either 40 or 60 units, but in
either case it was known with certainty. Now we switch that to a distribution
as well—also from 0 to 100 units, with equal probability on each value.
Making these assumptions, Ayres and Talley show that untailored liabil-
ity rules could be efficient because they induce the entitlement holder (al-
though not the nonholder) to reveal whether her valuation is more or less
than the governmentally determined amount of damages.68 With other kinds
of transaction costs, the authors acknowledge, property rules could still be
efficient. But liability rules can address the private-information problem in a
way that property rules cannot.
Once there is private information (and resulting uncertainty about par-
ties’ valuations), there is no guarantee that policy will achieve the efficient
outcome in every instance. Bargaining remains possible if the initial alloca-
tion is wrong, but that might not succeed either.
3. Externalities
Finally, suppose externalities are possible. Some externalities are recip-
rocal between the parties. Consider, for example, the law of nuisance. The
baker’s machinery disrupts the neighboring psychologist’s sessions; the psy-
chologist’s need for quiet disrupts the baking process.69 As Coase’s analysis
makes clear, the possibility of bargaining between the parties represents an
opportunity for the externality to be internalized by a market transaction.70
Under the right circumstances, each party will decide what to do while being
cognizant of the external cost her behavior exacts on the other party.
If one looks outside of the two parties, however, other externalities can
exist as well. For example, the baker’s customers and the psychologist’s cli-
ents could each be affected by the resolution of the nuisance dispute. This is
a perfectly common state of affairs with respect to intellectual property dis-
putes as well.71
The model of property disputes can be modified to allow for externali-
ties. Returning to the numerical example above, the owner faces a potential
drop in profits from 100 to 50 units if the user manages to use the property.
That loss of 50 units does not take into account the lost consumer surplus
that the owner’s customers would have experienced absent the disputed use.
For example, the psychologist’s clients might be deterred by the noise and
stay home, thereby losing the consumer surplus they would have gained
from paying the psychologist for his services. Even if the owner and the user
bargain, their decisionmaking will not take into account the positive exter-
nality that the owner’s customers would experience in the form of consumer
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] 11 Ch.D. 852 (Eng.).
70. Coase, supra note 58, at 9.
71. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 62, at 271–75.
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surplus. Similarly, the potential customers of the user’s products face the
same problem; the positive externality they experience from the user’s prod-
ucts would not be internalized.72
Of course, the owner’s and the user’s customers are not the only third
parties potentially harmed by the resolution of the dispute. People value
many things that they do not purchase, such as natural phenomena, wildlife,
and so on. Intangible goods in particular may hold value because of their
role in innovation, human knowledge, and cultural progress. Either the
owner’s property or the user’s activity may have larger externalities of this
sort. Calabresi and Melamed noted that this type of externality might cap-
ture some of what people consider the justice or fairness aspects of property
disputes.73
Policymakers might not have good information about the nature and
relative weight of the externalities on either side of a dispute. But if they do,
information about externalities could affect the initial entitlement and mode
used to protect that entitlement. For example, in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co., the court was cognizant that the employees of Atlantic Cement, their
families, and the local region benefited from the plant’s existence.74 A deci-
sion that shut the plant down, in terms of the two-party, reciprocal-harm
model, would have been a negative externality for the community.75 In
short, externalities can tip the scales for policymakers from one property
regime to another.
At this point it is useful to take stock. This Section began with a situa-
tion of reciprocal harm. With no transaction costs, no private information,
and no externalities, both social planning and private bargaining achieve the
efficient result. Any of Calabresi and Melamed’s four rules would produce
the same outcome in terms of who acts and who refrains. The only differ-
ence is in the distribution of wealth. Adding transaction costs to the mix
produces a situation in which the legal rule can matter a great deal. Consid-
ering private information and externalities can also generate a preference for
one rule or another depending on the factual situation.
B. Incorporating the Value of Control
Any model, even one that lawyers and economists have developed over
five decades, simplifies reality. The trick of theoretical work is to simplify in
the most elegant, parsimonious, and useful way possible.76 Some dimensions
72. Also, to the extent that enforcement is imperfect, there will be social value lost for
those who enjoy the leakage, that is, the free uses.
73. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1102–05.
74. 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 n.* (N.Y. 1970).
75. Of course, negative externalities could exist on the other side, stemming from the fact
that the plaintiffs received only damages. Those families and others might choose to move
away, for example. The court may have felt that these negative externalities would be less, in
total, than the negative externalities from shutting down the plant.
76. See Posner, supra note 63, at 17–19.
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of real-world situations are necessary to a good model, while other dimen-
sions are extraneous. A key argument of this Article is that the standard law-
and-economics model leaves out an important real-world feature of prop-
erty disputes: the subjective value of control for its own sake. Adding this
dimension to the model will provide better theoretical insight into property
disputes. More importantly, it will reveal a broader set of policy options and
generate useful prescriptions for policymakers.
This Section augments the standard law-and-economics model of prop-
erty disputes by providing a formal representation of the value of control. To
the standard model, this Section adds the idea of a two-dimensional space
for goods: (1) compensation and (2) control in and of itself. Economic anal-
ysis is not the only way to develop a theory of property disputes that recog-
nizes the separate value of autonomy. But in this Article, my aim is to show
that the economics of law can accommodate recognition of autonomy’s
value.
Parties to disputes over property, including intellectual property, may
care about control in and of itself.77 One might wonder whether the value of
control could simply be folded into monetary value. Indeed, economic anal-
ysis assumes (and sometimes asserts)78 that all goods are commensurable.
This Section will show that it is possible to account for the value of control
in numerical examples, such as the example involving the property owner
and the potential user that the previous Section explored.
1. Utility over Compensation and Control
This Section takes a utility-function approach to illustrate how individ-
uals’ preferences could reflect the value of compensation and the value of
control.79 But some caveats are in order. Utility functions are, of course,
abstractions. They need not reflect individuals’ conscious decisionmaking
processes.80 Rather, these models are designed to capture a way in which
individuals might behave if they were adhering to the prescriptions of a
mathematical function. Utility functions also leave out countless features of
reality in order to focus on a few key variables and better understand the
interactions among them.
The utility-function approach embeds both a utilitarian philosophy and
a rational-choice psychology.81 There are good reasons to question or even
77. One interesting issue is whether anticipation or regret affects individuals’ valuation
of control. Do people care more about control before they have it, when they have it, or after
they have lost it? Or do people value control at the same level, regardless of their situation?
78. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961
(2001) (defending a solely utilitarian approach to legal policies).
79. For a textbook description of utility-function approaches, see Hal R. Varian,
Microeconomic Analysis 94–98 (3d ed. 1992).
80. See Mas-Colell et al., supra note 66, at 11–14 (explaining the theory of revealed
preference).
81. See Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Economic Analysis, Moral
Philosophy, and Public Policy 45–55 (2d ed. 2006).
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reject both of these value systems.82 But even the critics of utilitarianism
generally consider utility as at least relevant to the ethical frameworks that
they find preferable.83 And many behavioral economists have used the ra-
tional-choice model as a starting point from which to measure the devia-
tions that arise in actual human behavior.84 Despite the limits of
utilitarianism, then, utility functions can tell us something interesting and
keenly relevant to property disputes.
In keeping with the core distinction of this Article, I will model com-
pensation and control as two separate goods over which parties to property
disputes have preferences.
The first good, which I call compensation, refers to enjoyment or
money.85 It is a flexible good that provides utility in terms of consumption
and savings. One can think about compensation in terms of the total
amount of enjoyment and money that property will generate over an infinite
time horizon or, alternatively, over some finite period. But one can also
think about the benefits that are generated from licensing a specific use by
another party.
The second good, control, refers to the ability to dictate whether a par-
ticular use occurs. Control might generate positive utility, and a lack of con-
trol might generate negative utility.86 As with compensation, one can think
of control over a long period or in terms of specific uses. Quantifying con-
trol can be handled in two ways as well. Control could be discrete: either one
has control or one does not. Control could also be modeled as a continuous
variable. For instance, an owner might have control over 70% of the possible
uses of the property in question. To the extent that the owner gets increasing
utility from control, she prefers having 80% control to 70%, and she prefers
70% to 60%.
Some readers might object by pointing out that compensation and con-
trol are commensurable. In other words, at the right price, a rights holder
might accept any use by any other person, even if that use offends her. This
argument may well be correct. But the commensurability of any two
goods—say, apples and oranges—does not imply that one cannot consider
the joint demand for apples and oranges.87 Furthermore, even if compensa-
tion and control are commensurable, the laws of property and intellectual
82. See id. at 55–59, 112.
83. See generally Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (1993) (de-
veloping an expressive theory of value that both critiques and takes careful account of eco-
nomic concerns).
84. See, e.g., Vernon L. Smith, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psy-
chology, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 877, 877–78 (1991).
85. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
86. The value of control need not be positive. For some individuals or in some circum-
stances, possessing decisionmaking authority could be undesirable and burdensome, and the
lack of such authority could provide joy. In this Article, however, I will assume that the value
of control is positive.
87. See, e.g., Varian, supra note 79, at 97–102 (demonstrating that utility functions can
model the substitution between two commensurable goods).
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property operate along both dimensions. Calabresi and Melamed’s four
rules each endow either the owner or the user with compensation, control,
or both.88
So far, I have identified two goods, the amounts of which can vary. The
set of possible amounts of compensation and control can be depicted in a
two-dimensional space, with compensation on the y-axis and control on the
x-axis. Each coordinate pair might be a lifetime allocation of entitlements or
the outcome of a single transaction. One way to think about a hypothetical
owner’s or user’s preferences within this space of outcomes is to ask the
following question: How much compensation and how much control are
necessary to give that party a certain level of utility? An individual might
have preferences such that many combinations provide equal utility. These
combinations trace out what economists call an indifference curve, because
the individual is indifferent between any two combinations that fall among
the same curve.89
Figure 1 is an example of a pair of indifference curves. Imagine that
Points A and B represent two different allocations of the two goods (com-
pensation and control) that the legal system could instantiate.
Figure 1.
Indifference Curves in Compensation-Control Space
 
In Figure 1, the upper indifference curve provides the individual with a
higher level of utility than the lower indifference curve. Together, the curves
display information about preferences across certain coordinate pairs. Com-
paring Point A to Point B, one can see that Point A provides a relatively
greater level of control but less compensation. Because Point B resides on a
88. See supra Section I.B.
89. See, e.g., Varian, supra note 79, at 100.
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higher indifference curve (that is, an indifference curve corresponding to a
higher level of utility for the owner), we can say based on Figure 1 that the
owner in question prefers Point B to Point A. This corresponds to the idea
that such an individual would prefer Rule Two to Rule Four—she would
prefer a statutory license protecting her entitlement to a reverse statutory
license protecting an entitlement that the other party holds.
Figure 2.
Differently Shaped Indifference Curves
Flip the Preference
 
In Figure 2, by contrast, the preference flips. The property owner with
these indifference curves prefers Point A to Point B. The owner prefers a
higher level of control and a lower level of compensation (in relative terms)
to a lower level of control and a higher level of compensation, at least for the
situations depicted in the figure. This aligns with the notion of preferring
Rule Four to Rule Two—preferring a “reverse liability rule” to being subject
to a statutory license.
Finally, it is worth noting that Points A and B could exist on the same
indifference curve. In that event, the owner would have no preference be-
tween Rule Two and Rule Four.
We can also model users as having utility functions over compensation
and control. Here, the compensation dimension is capturing how much the
user has to pay. The control dimension for users is analogous to the control
dimension for owners. Users’ preferences over Point A and Point B could go
either way, depending on their utility functions and the shape of the corre-
sponding indifference curves.
The utility-function analysis provides a new perspective on the standard
framework for thinking about property rights and entitlements. We cannot
say a priori that owners or users always have preferences that look like the
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preferences in Figure 1. On the contrary, it is quite possible that some actors
in the system might have preferences as depicted in Figure 2.
2. Disaggregating Harm
Proceeding from the premise that individuals have utility over both
compensation and control, we can now augment the standard analysis of
two-person property disputes. The first step is to disaggregate the harm that
each party experiences. We can distinguish between two categories of harm:
harm based on the outcome versus harm based on the process.
Harm based on outcome is entirely familiar to the standard law-and-
economics analysis.90 It represents the financial harm to each party’s projects
that results from the opposing party’s use. For example, a neighboring nui-
sance could lower a property’s market value.91 Harm based on outcome also
encompasses the satisfaction a party loses when she is unable to engage in
her preferred use. For instance, a would-be user of a new technology may
experience a subjective, personal loss if she cannot use a patented inven-
tion.92 Finally, harm based on outcome includes the personal dissatisfaction
that a party experiences when the opposing use occurs. For example, a
singer-songwriter might experience distress if another recording artist covers
one of his songs in a way he finds offensive.93 Thus, harm based on outcome
can be objective (that is, measurable in a market) or subjective.
Harm based on process, by contrast, serves as a new component in the
model of property disputes. It represents the value each party places on con-
trol—on having the power to make the decision whether the use occurs.
Part of the harm that stems from lacking the entitlement to prevent or en-
gage in a particular use is the subjective dissatisfaction from lacking control.
If a party values control to some extent—if she has a preference for a partic-
ular process or pathway toward achieving an outcome, and not just a prefer-
ence for that outcome—the analysis of entitlements, property rules, and
liability rules should take this value into account.
Returning to the numerical example,94 recall that the owner experienced
harm of 50 units (a drop from 100 to 50) as a result of the user’s prospective
activity. I suggest disaggregating these 50 units of harm into two categories.
90. See Fennell, supra note 7, at 963–66 (discussing personal enjoyment and returns
from trade, which are outcome based, as part of subjective value).
91. See, e.g., Burch v. NedPower Mount Storm, LLC, 647 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 2007)
(reversing dismissal of a nuisance claim alleging that a “wind power facility will cause a reduc-
tion in the appellants’ property values”).
92. See Ann Bartow, Inventors of the World, Unite! A Call for Collective Action by Employee
Inventors, 37 Santa Clara L. Rev. 673, 699–700 (1997) (stating that employee inventors who
lack the right to practice their inventions “may be thereafter personally frustrated and
unfulfilled”).
93. See, e.g., Jane Fryer, Haunted by His Greatest Hit, Mail Online (Jan. 5, 2011, 8:36
PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1344534/Baker-Street-rich-dreams-plunged-Ger
ry-Rafferty-drunken-self-destruction.html (quoting Gerry Rafferty describing a dance remix
of his most successful song as “ ‘dreadful, totally banal—it’s a sad sign of the times’ ”).
94. See supra Sections II.A.1–2.
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Suppose the objective market harm from the opposing use and the subjec-
tive dissatisfaction from witnessing the opposing use add up to 40 units. The
remaining 10 units of harm represent the value of control. In other words,
to be willing to cede the power to make the decision about the contested use,
the owner would require compensation of at least 10 units. The owner has
some degree of preference for calling the shots.
One can acknowledge the value of control without departing from the
utilitarian framework of standard economics. In fact, the utility-function
approach assumes that the value of control can be converted into dollar
terms. Moreover, this analysis still takes as given the parties’ preferences—
the value they each place on control—rather than speculating as to whether
one preference is more or less valid.
Different legal rules—like assigning property rights to one party or an-
other or choosing a property rule instead of a liability rule—instantiate dif-
ferent processes for resolving disputes. This Article’s contribution is to
recognize that these processes then become endogenous to the parties’ expe-
rience of the world. In other words, the processes themselves are goods that
each individual will value differently. Since the law allocates this power, it
makes sense for lawyers, economists, and policymakers to incorporate the
value of control into their thinking about assigning property rights.
3. Ranking the Initial Endowments Under Each Rule
Incorporating the value of control into the model of property disputes
reveals a surprising possibility about parties’ views of Rule Two and Rule
Four, the two liability rules.95 Normally, one would assume that having an
entitlement is preferable to lacking one. Conventional wisdom therefore
holds that the owner would prefer Rule Two to Rule Four, and the user
would prefer Rule Four to Rule Two. Calabresi and Melamed themselves
referred to the entitlement decision as primary, leaving the policy decision
about the method of protection as secondary.96 This led commentators to
suggest that having the entitlement is always preferable for any individual.97
But such a view assumes a one-dimensional, solely monetary mode of valu-
ing property rights. Once we adopt a two-dimensional framework for value
and incorporate the value of control, we see that the assumed preferences for
Rule Two and Rule Four can flip.
The numerical example can illustrate the point. Suppose the owner val-
ues at 100 units full property-rule protection, which includes the power to
block uses and the power to demand her subjective price to transfer the
entitlement. This value is equivalent to the initial endowment that the owner
95. For definitions of the rules, see supra Section I.B.
96. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1090.
97. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 63, at 92–94 (discussing the distributive effects of prop-
erty regimes with the implicit assumption that having the entitlement is preferable).
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would receive if policymakers chose Rule One.98 The owner remains per-
fectly free to sell the entitlement, but, if she is a rational economic actor, she
will gain from any trade. Thus, 100 units is merely her starting point—that
is, the amount of resources that the legal system gives her to start with.
In the example, the user’s activity would impose 50 units of harm on the
owner. The owner’s remaining 50 units of value are equivalent to the initial
endowment that the owner would receive if policymakers chose Rule Three
instead.99 Again, the owner may be able to make a deal; here, the deal would
be to improve her lot by purchasing the entitlement from the user. But the
owner’s starting point is 50 units. Thus, we can think of the quantum of
harm—the 50 units the owner stands to lose in the dispute—as the gap
between the initial values of Rule One and Rule Three from the owner’s
perspective. An analogous, reversed calculation could be done from the
user’s perspective.
We next determine how to value the initial endowments under Rule Two
and Rule Four. Consider Rule Two first. Under the standard law-and-eco-
nomics analysis, one would say that Rule Two endows the owner with 100
units of value—subject to the user’s option to engage in the use for a gov-
ernmentally determined fee.100 Valuing the option would depend on as-
sumptions about the user’s preferences, the level of the fee, and the
administrative costs of exercising the option, among other things. But the
base endowment would be 100 units—if the status quo holds, then the
owner would avoid any harm and would be as well off as she is under Rule
One.
Incorporating the value of control changes this analysis. The 50 units of
potential harm to the owner are disaggregated into 40 units of outcome-
based harm and 10 units of process-based harm.101 Rule One endows the
owner with both categories of value—the full 50 units of potential harm—
for a total endowment of 100 units. But Rule Two endows the owner with
only the value of the outcome-based harm—40 units, in this example—that
the entitlement allows her to avoid as an initial matter. By contrast, Rule
Two denies the owner the value of control, that is, the value of decisionmak-
ing power. The owner’s entitlement is subject to an option, and she knows
that she cannot stop the user from exercising that option. Regardless of the
outcome—regardless of whether the user actually exercises the option—the
owner never receives those 10 units of value. Thus, we would say that the
owner’s initial endowment is worth 90 units under Rule Two.
We can do the converse analysis to calculate the owner’s endowment
under Rule Four. The standard law-and-economics analysis would put the
98. Rule One means the owner has the entitlement, protected by a property rule, which
gives the owner both compensation and control. See supra text accompanying note 40.
99. Rule Three means the user has the entitlement, protected by a property rule. See
supra text accompanying note 40.
100. In this way, liability rules operate like “call” options. See Ayres & Goldbart, supra
note 47, at 4–5. In this Article, I leave aside property regimes designed like “put” options.
101. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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endowment at 50 units under that rule, plus the value of the option to block
use that the owner possesses under that regime. But recognizing the value of
control suggests that Rule Four gives the owner more than that. Under Rule
Four, the owner is the decisionmaker, regardless of whether she ultimately
exercises her option to block. Thus, the 10 units of value she places on con-
trol are part of her endowment under Rule Four, giving her an initial en-
dowment of 60 units.
In this example, the owner would still rank the rules in the same order
as she would in the traditional law-and-economics analysis.102 Rule One is
preferable to Rule Two (because 100 > 90), Rule Two is preferable to Rule
Four (because 90 > 60), and Rule Four is preferable to Rule Three (because
60 > 50). This preference ordering flows from the 10 units of value that the
owner places on control. The analogous ranking could be calculated from
the user’s perspective, based on the harm the user would experience from
being blocked and her own subjective value of control.
Now consider what would happen if the owner places an even higher
value on control. Suppose the value of control was 30 units instead of 10
units (while keeping the total harm fixed at 50 units). This would change the
initial value of Rule Two to 70 units: the difference between 100 (the value of
Rule One, which includes the value of control) and 30 (the value of control).
Meanwhile, the initial value of Rule Four would become 80 units: the sum of
50 (the value of Rule Three) and 30 (the value of control).
If the owner places a higher value on having control, the ranking of
rules changes. Rule Four becomes preferable to Rule Two (because 80 > 70).
Some individuals may have a strong preference for controlling the process—
that is, for being the decisionmaker. If this preference is strong enough, Rule
Four becomes more attractive than Rule Two from the owner’s perspective.
In general, the owner’s preference over initial endowments depends precisely
on whether the value of control is more or less than half the total harm.103
The owner may prefer not to have the entitlement if the entitlement would
be protected merely by a liability rule. Similarly, Rule Two could become
more attractive to the user than Rule Four, for completely analogous
reasons.
102. See infra Sections II.B.4–5.
103. In comparing the initial endowments, the owner is comparing the Rule One (best
possible) outcome, minus the value of control, to the Rule Three (worst possible) outcome,
plus the value of control. Add the value of control to both sides—this leaves a comparison
between the Rule One outcome on the left-hand side and the Rule Three outcome, plus two
times the value of control, on the right-hand side. Subtract the Rule Three outcome from both
sides—this leaves a comparison between the total harm (the Rule One outcome minus the
Rule Three outcome) and two times the value of control. Divide both sides by two. The right-
hand side is larger, and Rule Two’s initial endowment is preferred, if the total harm divided by
two is greater than the value of control. Conversely, the left-hand side is larger, and Rule
Four’s initial endowment is preferred, if the value of control is greater than the total harm
divided by two.
March 2015] Valuing Control 687
So far, I have demonstrated only the parties’ preferences with respect to
the initial valuations of each rule; I next consider how the value of the op-
tions affects parties’ preferences for Rule Two or Rule Four.
4. Four Scenarios
Rule Two gives the user an option to engage in the contested use as she
wishes. Exercising the option requires payment of a governmentally deter-
mined fee. Conversely, Rule Four gives the owner an option to block the use
and similarly requires payment of a governmentally determined fee to exer-
cise it. Each option presents two possibilities: either the possessor of the
option exercises it or she does not.
I will call the governmentally determined fee under Rule Two f2, and I
will call the fee under Rule Four f4.104 This notation will distinguish the two
fees and recognize that they may differ, perhaps substantially.105 We will also
assume for simplicity of exposition that there are no administrative costs.106
For now, we are simply taking f2 and f4 as given—something determined by
the government in a black box.
Making the assumption that individuals maximize their utility, one can
specify the conditions under which individuals would exercise their op-
tions.107 The user would exercise her option under Rule Two as long as the
outcome-based harm she would experience from not engaging in the use is
greater than f2. The user’s outcome-based harm is simply the total harm
that the user would experience from not being free to engage in the use,
minus the value of control. Similarly, the owner would exercise her option
under Rule Four whenever the outcome-based harm she would experience
from enduring the use exceeds f4. The owner’s outcome-based harm is the
total harm that the owner would experience if the use occurred, minus the
value of control.
To compare the policies of Rule Two and Rule Four, then, we must con-
sider four scenarios: (1) neither the user nor the owner would exercise her
option if it were granted to her; (2) the user would exercise her option under
Rule Two, but the owner would not exercise her option under Rule Four; (3)
the user would not exercise her option under Rule Two, but the owner
would exercise her option under Rule Four; and (4) both the user and the
owner would exercise their options if granted.
104. In scientific writing, one would ordinarily render f2 and f4 using subscripts. But for
purposes of this Article, I have found that “f2” and “f4” are easier for readers to distinguish.
105. I will assume that the fees are strictly greater than zero. Otherwise, when f2 = 0, Rule
Two and Rule Three would be equivalent. Similarly, when f4 = 0, Rule Four and Rule One
would be equivalent.
106. Greater administrative costs would make the liability rules less socially appealing rel-
ative to the property rules. More relevant to my purposes here, administrative costs would
increase the total cost to either party of exercising an option under Rule Two or Rule Four. My
argument in this Section is robust to adding administrative costs to the model, but such a
change would make the core result harder to see.
107. See Varian, supra note 79, at 98–102 (explaining utility maximization).
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In any of these four scenarios, depending on the details of the situation,
the owner could prefer Rule Four to Rule Two—that is, she could prefer
having decisionmaking power to having the entitlement. Analogously, the
user could prefer Rule Two to Rule Four in each of the four scenarios. Why
does this matter? First, it shows the importance of taking into account the
value of control; this value can reverse individuals’ policy preferences. Sec-
ond, it suggests that Rule Four may have more applicability than currently
appreciated.108 And third, it opens up several new policy possibilities dis-
cussed below.109
5. Conditions Under Which Owners Prefer Rule Four to Rule Two
Using our numerical example, I will now consider each of the four sce-
narios in turn and describe the conditions under which an owner could
prefer Rule Four to Rule Two. The converse results would follow analogously
for users.
a. Neither Would Exercise
In this scenario, neither party would exercise the option if she had it.
This means that, under Rule Two, the user would decide that f2 is too great a
price to pay to engage in the use. Similarly, under Rule Four, the owner
would decide that f4 is too great a price to block the use.
The ultimate outcome for the owner in this scenario is the same as her
initial entitlement under whichever rule is chosen. Thus, her preference be-
tween Rule Two and Rule Four will be determined in the same way as
before.110 In our numerical example, we specified that the owner faced po-
tential harm of 50 units. Under Rule Two, the owner receives an endowment
of 100 units minus the value of control. Under Rule Four, by contrast, the
owner receives an endowment of 50 units plus the value of control. She will
prefer Rule Four to Rule Two whenever the value of control is greater than
25 units.111
b. Only the User Would Exercise
In this scenario, f2 is low enough such that the user would exercise her
option if Rule Two were the chosen property regime. The owner, however,
would not exercise her option under Rule Four, because f4 is greater than
the outcome-based part of the harm she faces.
Thus, to compare Rule Two and Rule Four, we must compare the
owner’s outcome under Rule Two after the user has exercised her option
108. See infra Sections II.B.5, III.A.
109. See infra Part IV.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 100–103.
111. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining that the owner prefers Rule
Four whenever the value of control exceeds half the total harm).
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with the owner’s initial endowment under Rule Four. (The latter would re-
main unchanged because the owner would decline to exercise her option.)
Using the numbers in our example, the owner’s outcome under Rule Two is
50 units plus f2: even though the full harm is inflicted upon her, she is
compensated with the governmentally determined fee. Under Rule Four, the
outcome is 50 units plus the value of control. Thus, in this scenario, the
owner will prefer Rule Four to Rule Two whenever the process-based harm
exceeds f2.
c. Only the Owner Would Exercise
This scenario is the opposite of the preceding one. The owner would
exercise her option to block under Rule Four, but the user would decline to
exercise her option to use under Rule Two. We can compare these outcomes
from the owner’s perspective using our numerical example. Under Rule
Two, her outcome is 100 units minus the value of control. This is her initial
endowment under the rule, which (in this scenario) is left unchanged be-
cause the user would decline to exercise her option. Under Rule Four, the
owner’s outcome, if she chooses to block, is 100 units minus f4, the govern-
mentally determined fee.
In this scenario, then, the owner will prefer Rule Four to Rule Two
whenever the process-based harm exceeds f4. Just as in the second scenario,
the owner prefers Rule Four if she places a higher value on control than she
does on the amount of compensation required to block the disputed use.
But here, the owner must decide whether to pay to exercise an option or to
accept a loss of control.
d. Both Would Exercise
In this final scenario, we assume that each party would exercise her op-
tion if granted it. From the owner’s perspective, the comparison is between
50 units plus f2 (the Rule Two outcome) and 100 units minus f4 (the Rule
Four outcome).
The Rule Four outcome will be preferable whenever the owner’s total
harm exceeds the sum of f2 and f4.112 The owner will tend to like Rule Four
better: the greater the harm she faces, the cheaper it is to exercise her option
under Rule Four and the less appealing it is to accept compensation under
Rule Two. Thus, even when the value of control does not play a role, owners
might prefer Rule Four.
As the previous three scenarios show, however, taking into account the
value of control is often highly relevant. To identify all the situations in
112. The algebra works as follows. Start with the inequality that is required for Rule
Four’s outcome to be greater than Rule Two’s. This is 100 - f4 > 50 + f2. Add f4 to both sides
of the inequality. Subtract 50 from both sides. This leaves (100 - 50) > f2 + f4, or simply 50 >
f2 + f4. It is important to remain cognizant of what the number 50 in our example abstractly
represents: the gap between the owner’s best initial endowment (100) and her worst endow-
ment (50), that is, the maximum potential harm to the owner.
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which owners prefer Rule Four to Rule Two, it would be insufficient to con-
sider only the governmentally set fees f2 and f4. Indeed, acknowledging the
distinct value of control reveals a larger set of situations in which parties
have counterintuitive preferences.
The analysis under all four scenarios can be reversed to generate the
analogous conditions under which users would prefer Rule Two to Rule
Four. The key point is that either party might value decisionmaking power
over the right to receive compensation. This result flows from recognizing
that individuals can derive utility from both compensation and control.
C. Anticipating Critiques
This Section responds to anticipated critiques of my theoretical ap-
proach.113 Some of the objections are specific to disputes over intellectual
property, while others apply more generally to the economic analysis of
property disputes and the specific approach taken in this Article.
1. Doubts About the Subjective Value of Control
I have assumed in this Article that the harms in property disputes in-
clude both objective market harm and subjective psychological harm.114 Sub-
jective harm can arise from idiosyncratic party preferences or from
misperceptions of existing law, which can make the subjective valuation
seem suspect. For example, a songwriter previously unfamiliar with copy-
right law might have expected to decide who can record or perform her
song. Consider, then, this songwriter’s frustration upon learning that she
cannot block a cover version of her musical work. Similarly, a user will be
disappointed when she expects to use a work free and clear but then receives
a valid takedown notice through YouTube. And a company will be just as
disappointed when it buys patents later found to be invalid. In a sense, the
harm lies in the gap between expectations and reality. Characterizing own-
ers’ and users’ harm in this way may suggest to some observers that this is
no harm at all—it is simply the result of strange preferences or even a
mistake.
Yet policymakers must settle disputes in which parties have subjective
valuations, regardless of the source of those valuations. Just because some-
one should not feel harmed does not mean that she does not feel harmed.
After all, all harms are subjective in one way or another; the point of analyz-
ing subjective harm is to account for the idiosyncrasies.
Moreover, making a mistake of law does not render illegitimate the cor-
responding normative position—that is, the position that the law should be
as I mistakenly think it is. To the extent that property law has adopted a
position that gives an advantage to owners or users, a plausible argument
probably exists for the opposite position.
113. For a discussion of concerns about the practical implementation of Rule Four, see
infra Section III.A.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 2–7.
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2. Doubts About the Reciprocal Nature of Harm
Coase’s theory of reciprocal harm for nuisance disputes seems directly
applicable to intellectual property disputes.115 But one must be careful about
making the leap from real property to intellectual property; there are simi-
larities and differences.116 In economic terms, intangible goods have the
character of public goods.117 First, intangible goods are nonrival, at least to
some degree—for example, one person’s knowing the details of an invention
does not prevent another person from knowing that same information. Sec-
ond, it is difficult to exclude people from enjoying or possessing intangible
goods. Nonrivalry makes it seem, at least to some observers, that there is
little or no harm from unauthorized uses of intellectual property.118 Mean-
while, the difficulty of exclusion has led some to argue that preventing unau-
thorized uses is overly expensive or futile.119 Those holding this view might
reject any claim of reciprocal harm in the intellectual property context be-
cause they do not believe that unauthorized use truly harms owners.
On the other side, proponents of expansive intellectual property protec-
tion often argue that such protection causes no harm to putative users be-
cause substitutes are available.120 If intellectual property protection makes
goods more expensive, consumers deterred from purchasing the goods could
choose to buy something else. For example, downstream creators deterred
from purchasing a license to use intellectual property could redesign their
creation with another component or simply produce a different product al-
together. According to this view, the harm in these situations is marginal at
most, and sometimes even nonexistent.
These arguments against the reciprocal nature of harm are really argu-
ments against accounting for subjective valuation in another guise. Regard-
less of the optimal strength of intellectual property protections, a theory that
aims to resolve intellectual property disputes should recognize the subjective
harm that both owners and users might experience upon losing a property
dispute.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 58–59.
116. See supra note 11.
117. For a formal discussion of public goods, see Mas-Colell et al., supra note 66, at
359–64.
118. See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, Wired, Mar. 1994, at 84, available
at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html.
119. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, How the Motion Picture and Recording Industries Are Losing the
Copyright War by Fighting Misdirected Battles, FindLaw (Aug. 15, 2002), http://writ.news.find
law.com/commentary/20020815_yu.html.
120. See, e.g., David S. Olson, First Amendment Based Copyright Misuse, 52 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 537, 585–86 (2010) (discussing the argument that intellectual property rights do not
harm consumers through an exercise of market power).
692 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:663
3. Doubts About the Economic Analysis of Harm
One might object that property disputes require a more holistic ethical
approach than economic analysis can offer. In their article, Calabresi and
Melamed discuss situations in which morality dictates that an entitlement
should be inalienable.121 For instance, it would be morally repugnant to view
some harms, such as intentional torts or violent crime, as reciprocal. No
matter how much utility an individual derives from murder, we should not
allow that individual to commit such an act.
Intellectual property disputes illustrate this line of critique. Although
such disputes do not usually involve violence, they can take on a contentious
character—sometimes even leading the parties to use heated rhetoric sug-
gesting that one party has been harmed to a degree tantamount to harm
from violent crime.122 Moreover, moral-rights systems sometimes make par-
ticular rights inalienable, perhaps reflecting a judgment that granting users
certain rights would be unconscionable.123 Meanwhile, by reserving certain
exceptions and limitations, intellectual property law often recognizes that
users must have certain entitlements.124 Some scholars and policymakers
might therefore object that moral considerations should sometimes super-
sede economic analysis.
I think this is a valid concern. Economic analysis can and should be
tempered in recognition of other ethical considerations.125 Accordingly, the
discussion below about the practical implementation of Rule Four acknowl-
edges particular moral considerations, such as free-speech values, that limit
the scope of the property regime.126
4. Doubts About the Separate Value of Control
I have augmented the standard law-and-economics approach to prop-
erty disputes by assuming that actors place a value on control that is sepa-
rate from the value they place on the substantive outcome. One might
question the appropriateness of this assumption. It is true that economics
focuses on outcomes. For instance, the classical analysis of supply and de-
mand is a story about equilibrium—about the happy endpoint that society
reaches when a market operates.127 Valuing control, however, would also
consider how parties experience the process of reaching equilibrium.
121. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1111–15.
122. See Litman, supra note 22, at 1903 (quoting then–Motion Picture Association of
America Chairman Valenti’s comparison of the VCR to the Boston Strangler).
123. See Kwall, supra note 17.
124. See Netanel, supra note 32, at 1086.
125. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
126. See infra Section III.B.4.
127. See Varian, supra note 79, at 219. Economists have generally been less concerned
with, and less able to analyze, the process of reaching equilibrium. My microeconomics profes-
sor in graduate school referred to this silence on the process of reaching equilibrium as the
“soft underbelly” of economics. See Mas-Colell et al., supra note 66, at 620 (discussing the
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It may seem unorthodox to account for individuals’ preferences about
process. But this approach does not require abandoning a utilitarian frame-
work. Instead, it provides a way to incorporate the kinds of values that
nonutilitarians care about—such as justice, fairness, and autonomy—into a
utilitarian framework. Placing independent value on control takes advantage
of the flexibility of utility analysis.
Moreover, even if valuing control seems unfamiliar, it is useful to push
the conventional boundaries. Economic analysis of law, as an interdiscipli-
nary methodology focused on law and policy, should incorporate process
into the analysis. When the legal system allocates goods, individuals may
care about how the goods came into their possession.128 By accounting for
these individuals’ concerns, the model introduces a potential unfamiliarity
that is not a weakness but rather a strength.
III. Implementing the Missing Rule
This Article has outlined a new theory that explains how both liability
rules—Rule Two and Rule Four—can be useful for policy. Yet Rule Four is
rarely used with respect to real property, and it is barely considered with
respect to intellectual property. Scholars traditionally rely on Spur Industries,
Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.129 as an example that illustrates a practi-
cal application of Rule Four.130 Insisting on the policy relevance of this rule
puts one in the position of a physicist who has discovered one quantum
particle (that is, Rule Two) but has yet to observe its implied opposite.131 In
the context of one-on-one disputes between individuals or between individ-
ual entities,132 Rule Four remains unfamiliar.133
This unfamiliarity calls for some discussion of how Rule Four would
work in practice.134 It also suggests some reasons why policymakers have not
deployed the rule—reasons that will require institutional-design choices that
mitigate the rule’s drawbacks.135 Still, declining to use Rule Four more often
represents a missed opportunity. Using the full complement of Calabresi
discipline’s focus on equilibrium and its relative inability to make headway in specifying dy-
namic processes).
128. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Taking Outcomes Seriously, 2012 Utah L. Rev. 861,
902 (describing the importance of “how an outcome was brought about” to subjects in a
psychological study).
129. 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
130. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 8, at 444–45.
131. See, e.g., Christina Scelsi, Stopping the Collision: The Fight Over the Large Hadron
Collider, 5 SciTech Law. 8, 9 (2009) (describing quark pairs).
132. Professor Rose points out that Rule Four looks a lot like eminent domain, in which
many similarly affected individuals are on the owner’s side of the dispute. Carol M. Rose, The
Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2175, 2180 (1997). In that situation, the government is
both setting up the regime and exercising the option on behalf of a group of citizens. Id.
133. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property 99 (2010).
134. See infra Section III.A.
135. See infra Section III.B.
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and Melamed’s rules would help resolve disputes efficiently and fairly. Mak-
ing use of Rule Four in policy experiments would also allow policymakers to
learn more about the true preferences of parties engaged in property and
intellectual property disputes.136
A. How Rule Four Could Work
This Section explains how Rule Four—the reverse liability rule—would
work in practice. When considering implementation, one must recognize
that each of the four rules is really a category of rules.137 Choosing one of the
rules is only the first policy choice; many other dimensions of designing the
property regime must be considered. This Section offers some thoughts on
these choices.
1. Determining When to Deploy Rule Four
Suppose that a policymaker faces a dispute between a property owner
and a would-be user of a certain part or aspect of the property. What nor-
mative considerations should the policymaker rely on when choosing a
property regime?
Usually the analysis of property rules and liability rules proceeds from
the perspective of a policymaker seeking efficiency or, more broadly, from
the perspective of overall social welfare.138 This focus on efficiency makes
some sense. The point of property law and intellectual property law is not
usually seen as distributional, that is, shifting wealth from one class of actors
to another. Instead, property law is more suited to pursuing an efficient or
balanced policy. In law-and-economics scholarship, there is a strong prefer-
ence for focusing on efficiency—usually Kaldor–Hicks efficiency—rather
than on distributional goals.139
The model I have presented in this Article has concerned individuals’
preferences rather than Kaldor–Hicks efficiency. My rationale is that society
may have an interest in Pareto efficiency (that is, making sure each party is
no worse off) in addition to Kaldor–Hicks efficiency.140 Perhaps policymak-
ers might be receptive to distributional considerations as well.141 Put another
way, I use dispute resolution as my normative criterion. In a property dis-
pute, how might policymakers foster a compromise between users and
owners?
I acknowledge that many different criteria could inform policy choices.
For example, one could seek to choose the best decisionmaker first—that is,
the party that will make the most socially beneficial choices about how to
136. See infra Section III.C.
137. See supra Section I.B.
138. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1093–98; see also Ayres & Talley, supra
note 67; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 35; Krier & Schwab, supra note 8.
139. See Posner, supra note 63, at 14–17.
140. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
141. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1098–1101.
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use the resource.142 Arguments rooted in values other than efficiency could
also guide the policy choice.143 For example, First Amendment values might
suggest that users should have the power to decide whether to use a portion
of an existing copyrighted or trademarked work.144 My analysis represents
just one contribution to a large set of possible criteria for policy choices.
I have also focused on comparing the two liability rules, Rule Two and
Rule Four. By contrast, much of the existing literature focuses on the com-
parison between property rules and liability rules, between markets and reg-
ulation, between private actors and courts.145 This makes perfect sense given
the centrality of these questions to our politics.
There are many reasons policymakers might sensibly confine their at-
tention to liability rules, however. One possibility is that both property
rules—Rule One and Rule Three—are considered undesirable or infeasible
to implement. Liability rules, by contrast, become especially appealing when
the bargaining and decisionmaking costs of private transactions are rela-
tively high and the costs of governmental assessment are relatively low.146
Moreover, particular bargaining situations can give rise to several types of
inefficiencies that make property rules less desirable: holdout problems,147
hold-up problems,148 royalty-stacking problems,149 division-of-profit
problems in the sequential-innovation context,150 and so on. Sometimes lia-
bility rules are implemented mainly out of necessity, that is, because no
transaction was possible. For example, think of a car accident and the appli-
cable liability rules of tort law.151 Other times liability rules are put in place
because of antitrust concerns.152 Enforcement and monitoring costs could
142. See Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 47, at 12–26. If one party proves more adept at
assessing the facts of the situation, its superior information might be a compelling reason to
grant it control.
143. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1102 (discussing “other justice reasons”).
144. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
145. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 2655 (1994).
146. This requires explaining why the government has an informational advantage over
the parties to the dispute. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 8, at 454–55. One possible explana-
tion is a hold-up problem.
147. See Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, The Holdout Problem, Urban Sprawl, and Emi-
nent Domain, 16 J. Housing Econ. 309, 311–12 (2007) (explaining the holdout problem).
148. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L.
Rev. 1991, 1992–93 (2007).
149. See id. at 1993.
150. See Green & Scotchmer, supra note 61, at 20–21.
151. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1108–09; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 35,
at 752–54.
152. See, e.g., DiCola & Sag, supra note 43, at 203–09 (discussing the antitrust conflict
between radio broadcasters and the American Society of Composers, Arrangers, and Publish-
ers, and describing the partly public, partly private liability rule instituted to ease that con-
flict); F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 998, 1016–17 (1987)
(discussing the Federal Trade Commission’s case against Xerox and the resulting remedy,
which required compulsory licensing of patents).
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also justify liability rules; imagine a situation like protecting copyright in an
MP3 file, a situation in which a property rule is almost impossible to enforce
ex ante.153 Moreover, as long as exercising an option is voluntary, liability
rules can also serve as a default rule that encourages bargaining.154
Distributional concerns can also explain a preference for liability rules.
Liability rules are less extreme in the way they distribute resources because
they limit the rewards that the entitlement holder can demand. As a result,
the disparity between the two parties’ utilities will be smaller than it would
be under a property rule. Suppose a particular dispute is contentious—both
owners and users advance strong arguments that they should have the enti-
tlement. In such a situation, it might be preferable, based purely on grounds
of fairness in distribution, to choose one of the liability rules rather than one
of the property rules.155
Once the policymaker decides to implement one of the two liability
rules, considerations of administrative efficiency, informational efficiency,
or distributive fairness could lead to a choice of Rule Four over Rule Two.
But the new model presented in Part II, which accounts for the value of
control, uncovers a rationale for Rule Four that was previously buried: the
possibility that both parties have the same preference for Rule Four over
Rule Two.156 This additional reason to choose Rule Four may arise once the
field of policy choices has been narrowed to the two liability rules. From the
perspective of the two parties’ welfare, selecting Rule Four could be Pareto
efficient.157 Rather than setting up a zero-sum game, assigning entitlements
and deciding how to protect those entitlements would represent an opportu-
nity to generate mutual benefits.
Implementing this policy—choosing the liability rule that both parties
prefer, if they agree on their preference—requires the right circumstances.
Policymakers must identify a situation where the two property rules are ei-
ther unappealing or unavailable. To do so, they would need to know that
externalities do not tip the scale toward one side or the other. And, most
importantly, policymakers would need good information about each party’s
preferences. In particular, the government would need a way to assess how
153. See Tarleton Gillespie, Wired Shut: Copyright and the Shape of Digital
Culture 165 (2007) (describing failures of file-encryption efforts to enforce copyright). A
liability rule can be made very expensive in order to mimic a property rule as closely as possi-
ble. But in some contexts such a strategy appears to generate little deterrence.
154. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 67, at 1058–61; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 35, at
763–67. For particular applications, see Peter DiCola & David Touve, Licensing in the Shadow
of Copyright, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 397 (2014); Kristelia A. Garcı´a, Penalty Default Licenses: A
Case for Uncertainty, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1117 (2014).
155. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Fair Division, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 937, 942–43 (1999) (book
review) (advocating the application of fairness considerations in law and economics).
156. See supra Section II.B.
157. Why couldn’t the parties reach this result through a private transaction? In fact, they
might do so. But while parties can contract around liability rules, inefficiencies might impede
the necessary bargaining. My model builds on the standard law-and-economics approach,
which accounts for transaction costs, including private information. See supra Section II.A.2.
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much each party to a property dispute values control in and of itself. I ex-
plore these informational demands below and propose a method to begin
measuring the value of control.158
Policymakers should try to settle property disputes in a way that gives
each party some positive benefits. In instances where policymakers have nar-
rowed the options to liability-rule protections, they should seek mutually
preferred policy options. Even when the property rules remain feasible, it
may be useful for policymakers to understand parties’ preferences more pre-
cisely and recognize that parties can value control for its own sake.159 At a
minimum, the set of policy options that policymakers consider in both
property law and intellectual property law should include Rule Four, the
reverse liability rule.160
2. Determining How to Deploy Rule Four
Rule Four gives the property owner the option to block a particular use
in return for paying the user a governmentally determined fee. In the real-
property context, a resident subject to a nuisance could receive a special kind
of injunction requiring her to pay a fee determined by the court.161 In the
intellectual property context, an owner might pay a governmentally deter-
mined fee for the right to block a particular use of her invention or work.
Control belongs to the owner. Compensation, however, flows to the user.
As emphasized above, each of Calabresi and Melamed’s four rules is
really a category containing many specific policies. Many variations are pos-
sible in terms of what kind of governmental institution sets the fee, whether
the fee is tailored or untailored, and whether the rule applies to one-time
disputes or repeated interactions.
Under Rule Four, any governmental institution may set the fee f4,
whether it is a legislature, a court, or an administrative agency.162 A legisla-
ture might set the initial fee and arrange for inflationary adjustments. Alter-
natively, a legislature could delegate rate-setting to an administrative
agency.163 In situations with more individualized disputes, courts might
choose Rule Four as a remedy and craft an appropriate fee structure, along
with imposing an injunction that covers the blocked use in question.164
158. See infra Section III.C.
159. One reason is that parties can bargain in the shadow of liability rules. See supra note
154 and accompanying text.
160. This echoes a call made by intellectual property scholar Dan Burk. Burk, supra note
46, at 100–05; see also McLeod & DiCola, supra note 18, at 261–66 (outlining a reverse
liability rule for music sampling).
161. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
162. See supra notes 104–106 and accompanying text.
163. The Copyright Royalty Board serves as the Rule Two analogue of this in copyright
law. See 17 U.S.C. § 801 (2012).
164. See Spur Indus., 494 P.2d at 706–08.
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The fee that allows an owner to prevent use of her property under Rule
Four could either be tailored or untailored.165 A tailored fee refers to an
individualized process by which the government determines the appropriate
fee for a specific owner, based on its estimates of the harm each party would
experience without the right to the use. This is what a court does when it
implements Rule Four (or Rule Two) in a specific case. By contrast, an un-
tailored fee would be an across-the-board price that all owners of a certain
property type would face in order to exercise their option. Tailoring can be a
matter of degree—that is, fees could be tailored to particular subgroups of
owners.
Institutional design also requires choosing how many users the option
will be valid against once it is exercised. Rule Four could offer owners the
opportunity to block all uses of a particular type with a one-time fee. This
design would mean that Rule Four allows owners to pay for stronger prop-
erty rights if they want them.166 Alternatively, Rule Four could proceed in-
stance by instance, requiring the owner to pay a fee each time she wishes to
block a particular user.167 The one-time-fee version of Rule Four may not
have a clear precedent in property law. But it looks a lot like offering owners
stronger rights for a fee, except that the proceeds are paid to the user rather
than to the government.168 Thus, Rule Four could act like a costly screen,
helping policymakers sort out which owners value blocking the use and
which do not.169 In sum, to implement Rule Four, policymakers must choose
between a one-time fee and an each-time fee.
Like Rule Two, Rule Four need not prohibit voluntary transactions.170
After paying the fee, the owner could always exercise the option and then
license the use under modified terms. For instance, the owner could demand
a higher licensing fee. Or, once she has exercised her option under Rule
Four, the owner could offer the user a license that cabins the originally de-
sired use to a use of more limited scope.
165. See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 67 (analyzing bargaining under both tailored and
untailored compensation structures).
166. This one-time-payment structure would lead to a policy similar to one that requires
renewal fees in order for copyrights or patents to last longer. See William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 471, 477 (2003). The fee in
Professor Landes and Judge Posner’s proposal would be paid to the government, not to the
user, which represents a significant difference. See id.
167. I discuss concerns about extortion below. See infra Section III.B.2.
168. I discuss concerns about wealth effects below. See infra Section III.B.3.
169. See David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 Vand. L.
Rev. 677 (2012) (describing the effects and uses of costly screens); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly
Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. Legal Analysis 687 (2010) (same); cf. Ayres & Talley,
supra note 67, at 1039–47 (arguing that liability rules can have this screening effect).
170. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2012) creates a statutory license for reproductions
and distributions of musical compositions, but parties to this license typically contract around
the governmental license. Donald S. Passman, All You Need to Know About the Music
Business 217 (9th ed. 2012) (“[T]he compulsory license is almost never used. . . . The copy-
right owners (publishers) would rather give a direct license because they can keep track of it
easier.”).
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This last possibility highlights the fact that Rule Four requires a govern-
mental institution not only to set the fee but also to define the scope of the
use in question. At the root of this analysis is a dispute over a particular use.
When the government wishes to deploy Rule Four (or Rule Two, for that
matter), it must specify the use that is subject to an option. In other words,
the government must decide exactly what activities the owner may prevent
the user from engaging in. Other uses can be subject to other rules—that is,
the property can be disaggregated into a bundle of possible uses, with each
use potentially subject to a different rule.171
Rule Four may also require some administrative apparatus to keep track
of the exercised options, to collect fees, and to resolve disputes over the op-
eration of the rule itself. These administrative costs are important to assess-
ing the rule’s desirability in the first place, since the costs represent one of
liability rules’ potential disadvantages compared with property rules.
B. Obvious Problems and Design Responses
Rule Four is an uncommon approach to assigning entitlements and vin-
dicating property interests. It remains the missing rule. This absence proba-
bly reflects its several drawbacks. I call these drawbacks “obvious problems”
because they tend to arise immediately in conversations about Rule Four. In
this Section, I will discuss ways to mitigate these problems and suggest that
the missing rule should be part of policymakers’ toolkit after all.
1. Will the Government Get the Price Wrong?
Liability rules—both Rule Four and its mirror image, Rule Two—call
for the government to set the price of an option, whether it is an option to
block (Rule Four) or to use (Rule Two). In that sense, liability rules are
heavier-handed intervention by the government than either of the property
rules. Indeed, while all four rules for protecting entitlements require govern-
mental enforcement of the boundaries, only the liability rules involve gov-
ernmental price-setting.
Along these lines, Rule Four is objectionable to some because liability
rules are undesirable, or at least suspect, in much the same way that all
governmental price-setting is considered undesirable or suspect.172 A fair
portion of the literature on property rules and liability rules focuses on de-
bating this point.173 And some of the political dissatisfaction with existing
171. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1. But see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 366–75 (2001)
(criticizing the bundle-of-rights view).
172. The policy preference for market actors to set or negotiate prices, which is based on
economic thinking, has been ascendant in the United States since the late 1970s. See Stephen
Breyer, Airline Deregulation, Revisited, BloombergBusinessweek (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www
.businessweek.com/stories/2011-01-20/airline-deregulation-revisitedbusinessweek-business-
news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (describing the political deregulation of the airline in-
dustry beginning in 1978).
173. Compare Posner, supra note 63, with Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 35.
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liability rules centers on complaints about the process of governmental
price-setting (beyond the standard complaints that the price chosen is too
low or too high).174 Moreover, because of policymakers’ relative unfamiliar-
ity with Rule Four, one might be concerned that the lack of experience will
make price-setting under Rule Four even more costly to administer and even
less accurate than under Rule Two. Meanwhile, Rule One and Rule Three
avoid price-setting entirely by leaving any transfers to private transactions.
Here, the economist’s answer must be that it depends on the circum-
stances. Property rules and liability rules each have costs and benefits, draw-
backs and attributes. The appropriate economic stance is one of agnosticism.
Comparative institutional analysis is required to decide which method of
protection is optimal. By highlighting some advantages of Rule Four in this
Article, I mean only to argue that Rule Four should be considered on an
equal footing with the other rules in the abstract. Governmental price-set-
ting is subject to errors, but so is private price-setting. There may be circum-
stances in which the government is more likely than private actors to get the
price (that is, the fee, f2 or f4) correct on average.175 In that event, liability
rules can be more efficient. Governmental price-setting may also be desira-
ble in light of externalities or noneconomic policy considerations.176 Thus,
possible mistakes in governmental price-setting are only one factor to con-
sider in the overall desirability of Rule Four.
2. Will Rule Four Lead to Extortion?
Perhaps the most common objection to Rule Four relates to the possi-
bility of extortion.177 The concern is that many sham users will threaten
property owners with contrived, offensive, and damaging uses, all in an at-
tempt to induce the property owner to pay them f4 for the use that must be
blocked. This is the reverse of “coming to the nuisance”178—in this scenario,
the user is making himself a nuisance and taking advantage of the fact that
Rule Four grants him the entitlement. What’s worse, individual users might
show up multiple times with phony claims about desiring to use the prop-
erty in a particular way, essentially hoping to make the owner an ATM.179
174. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing composers’ complaints about
the statutory license of 17 U.S.C. § 115).
175. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 35, at 750–51 (discussing the efficiency of pollution
taxes relative to that of tradable pollution rights).
176. See supra Section III.A.1 (discussing externalities and “other justice reasons” as possi-
ble justifications for liability rules).
177. See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the
Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 815, 825 (1988) (“Broadly speaking, coercive
extortion can refer to any illegal use of a threat or fear to obtain property or advantages from
another, short of violence that would be robbery.”).
178. “[C]oming to the nuisance” played a large role in Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Development Co., a case that applied Rule Four. 494 P.2d 700, 706–07 (Ariz. 1972). Thus, the
opposite of coming to the nuisance makes sense as a drawback of that rule.
179. Even worse, firms might arise to monetize and aggregate opportunities for extortion.
Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 553, 562–63 (1983).
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And in the context of intangible property, it is inexpensive to find and use
others’ preexisting works, which exacerbates the general concern about ex-
tortion under Rule Four.
That Rule Four could be used in this strategic fashion is a real problem
requiring administrative responses. To combat the issue, the government
could offer an administrative process to allow owners to challenge a user’s
entitlement to f4 on grounds of bad faith.180 Even the presence of some ad-
ministrative costs and hurdles could be used as a screen to limit the entitle-
ment to bona fide users.181 And Rule Four could be implemented with a cap
to prevent the same user from instigating multiple disputes with the same
owner. Alternatively, an individual owner might need to pay a fee only once
to block an individual user from using the property within a certain period
of time.
Another institutional-design possibility—one that takes the property re-
gime out of the traditional Calabresi and Melamed framework but retains
some features of Rule Four—would direct the compensation paid under
Rule Four to the government rather than the user. The government could
then distribute the fees to a class of users or likely users rather than to indi-
vidual users. For example, if copyright law applied Rule Four to digital sam-
pling, the fees collected when owners opt to block use could be aggregated
and distributed to musicians’ groups or arts organizations.182 Policymakers
might decide that owners must pay into a fund that promotes expression
precisely because the owners’ decision to exercise the option has thwarted
expression. For some readers, this particular implementation of Rule Four
will only inflame their dislike of the proposal rather than ameliorate it. But
it is one way to address the extortion issue.
3. Will Rule Four Create Unfair Advantages for Wealthy Owners?
Another important objection concerns the way in which Rule Four in-
teracts with owners’ wealth. Suppose that Rule Four were set up such that a
one-time fee purchased the right to block any uses of a certain type. Under
that version of the proposal, it is easy to imagine that wealthy owners would
readily purchase the option to block use by others. Wealthy owners could
purchase control rights as a routine cost of doing business. Users’ entitle-
ments to wealthy owners’ property would not mean much in practical terms
because the owners could always afford to block those entitlements.
180. In the copyright context, for example, challenges to bona fide use could be treated as
small claims. The Register of Copyrights is exploring the possibility of implementing small-
claims courts for copyright. See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 Colum.
J.L. & Arts 315, 327–28 (2013); see also Internet Policy Task Force, Dep’t of Commerce,
Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy (2013), http://
www.uspto.gov/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf.
181. See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 169, at 679–81 (“[Administrative costs and hur-
dles] are costly screens . . . [that] cause actors to self-select against acquisition of rights that
will not generate much private value . . . .”).
182. McLeod & DiCola, supra note 18, at 265–66.
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Next, suppose that Rule Four were set up as an every-time fee, requiring
payment to block each use by each individual user. Under this regime, it is
clear that poor owners would find it difficult to block multiple uses. They
might end up at the mercy of users.
No property regime makes it easy to reduce or neutralize the effect of
wealth in society. It would be unappealing to adjust f4 for wealth because
such an adjustment would make wealthy owners an especially attractive tar-
get for extortion. By contrast, the problem of disadvantaging less wealthy
owners could be mitigated. One institutional-design choice would involve
structuring f4 as a small fraction of future sales of the owner’s work. This
solution in fact represents the mirror image of the statutory license for mu-
sical works, which operates on a per-copy basis.183 In such a scheme, less
wealthy owners could pay as they go.
4. How Can Rule Four Be Squared with Important Rights?
Giving an owner an option to block use, if not implemented properly
and carefully, could interfere with important rights of users. In the real-
property context, some uses might involve core interests. For example, in
certain circumstances physical safety may require a trespass, as when a car
jumps the curb and pedestrians must flee the sidewalk. In the intellectual
property context, some uses might constitute fair use.184 Because the fair-use
doctrine allows for critical, educational, and other uses without permission
or a license,185 the doctrine crucially protects the First Amendment rights of
users.186 Rule Four raises the troubling prospect of owners’ exercising their
options to block expressive uses, uses of brand names, or research uses.
The legal response, while easily articulated, could prove complicated to
implement. The simplest answer to the dilemma goes as follows: Rights like
freedom of speech must occasionally trump property rights, just as they do
under existing law. Regardless of which rule is chosen, doctrines like fair use
or the research-use exemption take precedence.187 Yet setting up formal pro-
cedures that vindicate those rights and privileges could be more difficult.
And ensuring that these rights and privileges are meaningful in practice
presents an even more complex task of institutional design. As one example,
some are concerned that fair use is not practically beneficial in contexts like
the music industry.188
183. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(2) (2012) (“[T]he royalty under a compulsory license shall be
payable for every phonorecord made . . . .”).
184. Fair use exists in both copyright law and trademark law. Patent law contains a limited
exception for research use, which is certainly not equivalent to fair use but still represents an
important right of users.
185. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
186. See Netanel, supra note 32, at 1105.
187. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 22.
188. See, e.g., McLeod & DiCola, supra note 18, at 238–40. But see Patricia
Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Reclaiming Fair Use (2011) (describing a best-practices ap-
proach to enhancing the practical utility of fair use).
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A key question is whether implementing Rule Four would have complex
repercussions that might upset the balance of power between owners and
users. Without sound institutions to vindicate rights and without an under-
standing of how private institutions and private actors will respond to the
system, it is difficult to predict how Rule Four could threaten rights and
privileges—even if the black-letter law clearly indicated that these rights and
privileges supersede owners’ option to block use. I acknowledge this limita-
tion and urge policymakers to take it seriously. When implementing Rule
Four, they must engage in careful design and monitoring efforts in order to
safeguard important rights.
In sum, if implementing Rule Four appears appropriate, there are ways
to alleviate the concerns associated with it. I do not mean to minimize those
concerns, nor do I intend to suggest that Rule Four should come to domi-
nate our thinking about property, real or intangible. My point is rather that
Rule Four is a tool that policymakers should keep in their toolbox and some-
times deploy. It could produce the best result in certain contexts, resolving
disputes in a way that balances the interests of creators, users, and the gen-
eral public. Adopting Rule Four as a background rule could also spur the
parties to a property dispute, large or small, to bargain toward the best
solution.
C. Experiments with Rule Two and Rule Four
Bringing Rule Four more fully into the policy conversation opens up the
possibility of policy experiments.189 Information about the parties’ true valu-
ations of reciprocal harm plays a central role in property disputes. Develop-
ing better information about the preferences of certain types of disputants
could facilitate more efficient and more equitable resolution of their dis-
putes. Employing Rule Four could help us develop that information.
Suppose that policymakers have found that a particular kind of property
dispute is not amenable to either of the property rules.190 Suppose also that
there are a set of owners and a set of users who are involved in disputes with
some relevant similarities. For example, think of the patent holders in mo-
bile-phone technology as the owners and the manufacturers of mobile
phones as the users. The preceding analysis has shown that, from each
party’s perspective, we cannot know a priori whether the parties will prefer
Rule Two or Rule Four. Standard law-and-economics analysis demonstrates
that the government must estimate the total harm to each party in order to
choose its rule.191 This Article suggests that the government should also at-
tempt to estimate what portion of the harm is due to the loss of control for
its own sake.192
189. On policy experiments generally, see Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law,
159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929 (2011).
190. This can be a result of practical limitations in enforcement or of the inefficiencies
that can arise in bargaining. See supra notes 146–155 and accompanying text.
191. See supra Section II.A.2.
192. See supra Section II.B.
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How should the government go about this inquiry? By making Rule
Four a plausible policy option in addition to Rule Two, the government
would have the opportunity to set up a choice. One choice would be Rule
Two, with fee f2 set at a particular level. The other choice would be Rule
Four, with fee f4 also set at a particular level. Either party, as a subject in the
policy experiment, would need to know both f2 and f4 in order to know
what she would have to pay to exercise her option (if she chose the rule that
gave her one) and what she would receive if the other party exercised an
option (if she chose the opposite rule).
The fee levels could be varied on a random basis. For example, f2 could
be set at either 1% or 2% of the revenue the user derives from the use, while
f4 could vary between 3% and 5% of the revenue the owner derives from the
property. Each party to a dispute of this type would then face a different
menu of options. The choices would have real consequences, which means
that each party would be revealing her true preferences.
By observing how the parties made their choices, the government could
begin to learn about the harm that each party would experience. Over time,
it would be possible to discern parties’ subjective value of control from their
choices. As discussed above, preferences between Rule Two and Rule Four
depend on whether the parties expect the options to be exercised.193 But this
expectation could be measured in order to determine which of the four sce-
narios the parties expect to be in when choosing between rules. With that
information, together with information about the level of fees, policymakers
could infer how parties value harm as well as the portion of that harm at-
tributable to the separate value of control.194
Although in many examples I use the owners to illustrate the economic
analysis, both owners and users must be subjects of the policy experiments.
Balance and fairness require this symmetrical treatment. Whichever party
gets to choose the legal regime receives a separate kind of benefit—a sort of
meta-benefit—in the form of an opportunity to exercise control. There is no
a priori reason to bestow that benefit on owners or users during the experi-
mental period.
Allocating this benefit to one side or the other raises an important ethi-
cal problem that is endemic to experiments conducted in real-world settings.
The nature of the experiment affects the parties’ interests, perhaps pro-
foundly. To address this reality, policymakers should test fee levels that are
within a realistic range. Parties would still be free to bargain around the
liability rule or to make a transaction after the option is exercised.
Conducting these policy experiments with both owners and users as
subjects, and giving individuals in each position the choice between Rule
Two and Rule Four, would help identify instances where the two sides’ pref-
erences actually align. Policy experiments might reveal that most owners (in
a certain type of dispute) prefer Rule Four and that most users also prefer
Rule Four. The same could be true of Rule Two. Such a situation presents an
193. See supra Section II.B.4.
194. See supra Section II.B.5.
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opportunity for compromise through choosing the mutually preferred
rule.195 Without conducting the policy experiments, identifying these oppor-
tunities would rely too heavily on speculation.
IV. Applications
This Part proposes some specific areas of the law where Rule Four might
be deployed—or at least considered. My goal is to outline a new analytical
framework, spark discussion, and suggest a research agenda.
A. Copyright
Because copyright law deals with original works of expression, disputes
about control and creative autonomy often arise. In copyright disputes in-
volving an upstream copyright owner–creator and a downstream creator,196
for example, both sides usually seek and value control independent of finan-
cial rewards. Thus, copyright is a natural area to incorporate the value of
control into law-and-economics analysis.197
One way to see the usefulness of valuing control—and of considering
Rule Four as a viable approach to copyright disputes—is by process of elimi-
nation. In copyright, Rule One—meaning property-rule protection for cop-
yright owners—has become difficult to enforce in many circumstances.
Unauthorized file-sharing’s traffic has declined somewhat in recent years,
but the practice continues on a large scale worldwide.198 Moreover, Rule One
does not always lead to a robust licensing market; on the contrary, copyright
licensing can be cumbersome on both a small and large scale.199 Strong
property rights can backfire on copyright owners.
Rule Three—property-rule protection for copyright users—has short-
comings as well. The rule applies to situations in which works or aspects of
works are in the public domain, broadly conceived.200 It is a commonplace
195. See supra Section III.A.1.
196. The other broad categories are owners more generally (who might not be the cre-
ators) versus downstream users more generally, owners versus consumers, and aggregate own-
ers versus distributors–new technologists. Parties in these other categories might value control
in and of itself, but such a situation is harder to imagine for corporate actors on either side of
the dispute. Managers might place psychological value on control, but they are distinct from
the entity that employs them, which makes the welfare analysis more complicated.
197. See supra Section II.B.
198. See generally Sandvine, Global Internet Phenomena Report 1H 2014 (2014),
available at https://www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internet-phenomena/2014/
1h-2014-global-internet-phenomena-report.pdf (describing the declining portion of global in-
ternet traffic devoted to file-sharing but noting the continued prominence in many countries
of file-sharing applications like BitTorrent).
199. See McLeod & DiCola, supra note 18, at 158–86 (describing the inefficiencies of
sample licensing); DiCola & Touve, supra note 154, at 442–52 (describing the inefficiencies in
licensing digital music services).
200. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965, 976 (1990) (“But the class
of works not subject to copyright is, in some senses, the least significant portion of the public
domain. The most important part of the public domain is a part we usually speak of only
706 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:663
to criticize fair use for being unpredictable,201 but that claim turns out to be
exaggerated.202 A more trenchant critique is that, in some industry contexts,
fair use is not utilized.203 Besides, in certain circumstances Rule Three will
have distributional consequences that are too extreme; sometimes the copy-
right owner should have a claim to some of the value that stems from the
use.
Now consider Rule Two in the copyright context. The copyright statute
contains several statutory licenses,204 and copyright owners bristle when
Congress imposes such licenses.205 But their displeasure is not necessarily a
reason to discard Rule Two—policy compromises will probably leave every
party at least a bit unhappy, and some of the complaints may amount to
grandstanding for a higher f2. But there are real problems with copyright’s
statutory licenses. Some upstream creators who value control highly would
be dismayed at losing the right to deny permission to use their work to
downstream creators.206
At this point, the process of elimination leads one to wonder whether
Rule Four has some traction in certain types of copyright disputes. Suppose
that tailoring the fees under either liability rule is prohibitively expensive
from an administrative standpoint, such that untailored versions are pre-
ferred. Where the value of the harm to the copyright owner (whether the
financial harm or the value of control) is highly idiosyncratic, an untailored
version of Rule Two becomes unappealing.
But an untailored version of Rule Four allows policymakers to limit the
harm to copyright owners who would otherwise experience harm greater
than the fee f4 if the use occurred. Rule Four gives the downstream creator
the entitlement to the use, subject to an option held by the copyright owner.
This bestows on the copyright owner the power to object to certain uses, at a
cost. On the other side of the dispute, the downstream creator might be
willing to find a substitute for a particular audio sample, text snippet, or
video clip. Such substitutes can sometimes be serendipitous.207 Rule Four,
obliquely: the realm comprising aspects of copyrighted works that copyright does not
protect.”).
201. See, e.g., David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66
Law & Contemp. Probs. 263, 279–84 (2003).
202. See, e.g., Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 47 (2012) (conducting an
empirical study of fair use showing that some variables are predictive of results in fair-use
cases).
203. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
204. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012) (reproductions of musical works); id. § 116 (jukeboxes);
id. § 119 (satellite retransmission of video).
205. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. On the psychology of creators more gener-
ally, see Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the
Psychology of Creativity, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1999 (2011). See also Jessica Silbey, Harvest-
ing Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and “Work-Makes-Work,” Two Stages in the Crea-
tive Processes of Artists and Innovators, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2091 (2011).
207. See McLeod & DiCola, supra note 18, at 104–06, 189–94.
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however, would recognize the burden of blocked sampling, remixing, and
other reuses by compensating the thwarted sampler for having to adjust.
Although this cost might vary across users, it could have less variance than
the idiosyncratic value of control to copyright owners. When that is the case,
Rule Four is preferable to Rule Two because the government would have a
better chance of correctly setting f4 than f2. For these reasons, copyright
policymakers should begin to consider Rule Four.
My point here is certainly not that Rule Four should become the norm
in copyright. I am claiming only that Rule Four could prove useful in some
situations.
In certain circumstances, the desire for control over copyrighted works
is an unsympathetic, even unconstitutional, position. Giving control to cop-
yright owners can serve merely to block the free expression of downstream
creators for petty reasons. It is worth remembering, however, that giving
control to copyright owners is a feature of both Rule One and Rule Four.
The idea–expression dichotomy and fair-use doctrine provide safeguards for
speech,208 and they can be applied to either rule. These doctrines effectively
switch the property regime to Rule Three where First Amendment values
call for doing so. But in other contexts it is easier to sympathize with the
copyright owner’s desire for control. Suppose a creator’s artwork is used in
an advertisement against her will. Or suppose a musician’s song becomes the
soundtrack to a political campaign for a candidate he vehemently opposes. A
statutory license could seem undesirable, even harmful to free speech, if it
places extreme burdens on interests in personality or identity.
B. Trademark
Individuals value control in trademark disputes as well. One of the most
controversial developments in trademark law in recent decades has been the
expansion of trademark protection against dilution.209 In a dilution claim,
the owner of a trademark complains that the mark has been used in connec-
tion with an unrelated good; consumer confusion about source need not
come into play.210 Several scholars criticize this development as improperly
expanding trademark’s focus to encompass unfair competition.211 Other
commentators defend the historical roots of this approach.212 The area
clearly remains contentious.
Currently, trademark law considers three of Calabresi and Melamed’s
rules. It allows a trademark owner to get an injunction after a finding of
208. See Netanel, supra note 32, at 1106–13.
209. See generally Jerre B. Swann, The Evolution of Dilution Law in the United States from
1927 to 2006, in International Trademark Dilution §§ 3:1–3:30, at 40–97 (2013 ed. 2013).
210. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale
L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999).
211. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky
Road, 24 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 469, 472–74 (2008); Rebecca Tushnet,
Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 507 (2008).
212. See, e.g., Swann, supra note 209, § 3:15, at 67–68.
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dilution—that is Rule One.213 Damages are rare but possible; that would be
Rule Two.214 And in the event that no dilution is found or a defense is suc-
cessful, the particular use would be handled with Rule Three.215 Again, Rule
Four is missing.
But Rule Four should be considered in trademark law. An option to
block certain uses of trademarks would be one form of compromise between
trademark owners and users, particularly in some of the harder dilution
cases. For instance, consider disputes where the marks are identical but non-
competing.216 A user is less likely to harm an owner through using a trade-
mark in a noncompeting market than she would be in a competing market.
My sense is that trademark dilution has been too broad, so I would advocate
for some cases currently handled with Rule One to be handled instead with
Rule Four. Under a Rule-Four approach, if the user must be denied control,
at least the rule compensates the user when a trademark owner wishes to
block a use.
Another area in which Rule Four might prove beneficial is expressive
uses of trademarks. In most cases, Rule Three may serve as the best ap-
proach to protecting users’ rights to use trademarks, and this seems to be
the status quo.217 But it may be worth exploring whether there are some
types of uses that are more ambiguous in character and in which the owner’s
claims are more sympathetic. Rather than facing a stark choice between Rule
One and Rule Three, policymakers could use Rule Four in a limited way to
vindicate owners’ value of control—in cases where doing so is legitimate.
This would require carefully delineating the boundaries of the expressive
uses to which Rule Four applied instead of Rule Three.
C. Patent
Unlike the other areas of intellectual property law, patent law seldom
seems influenced by considerations of personal autonomy. But there are ex-
ceptions. Consider university researchers who wish to donate their work to
the public domain but have concerns that others will misuse their invention
in various ways—for example, by selling knock-off versions that take advan-
tage of consumers.218 Statutory invention registrations are another instance
213. 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 24:132 (4th ed. 2014) (describing remedies under the federal antidilution statute).
214. Id.
215. See id. § 24:123 (providing an overview of defenses to the federal antidilution
statute).
216. Cf. id. § 24:68 (discussing the core purpose of dilution in the course of criticizing
antidilution law’s expansion beyond that purpose).
217. See William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 253, 287–91 (2013) (“[C]ourts seem increasingly to understand the importance
of protecting the type of expressive uses we have highlighted . . . .”).
218. See Grischa Metlay, Reconsidering Renormalization: Stability and Change in 20th-Cen-
tury Views on University Patents, 36 Soc. Stud. Sci. 565, 572–73 (2006) (describing the atti-
tudes of the developers of insulin).
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in which inventors exert a degree of control and ensure that others cannot
patent the registered technology.219 These examples suggest that control can
be a value for some inventors.
Thus, in some circumstances it could be socially beneficial to vest users
of patented technologies with the entitlement but allow the patentee to re-
tain an option to block certain uses for a fee. Rule Four therefore merits
further investigation in the area of patent policy.
D. Privacy
Privacy is a multifaceted concept.220 Digitization, internet connectivity,
national-security initiatives, social networking, and other features of con-
temporary life have brought privacy to the center of policy discussions.221
Rule Four should be part of policymakers’ thinking about the particular so-
lutions that involve ownership of personal data. Privacy law provides a per-
fect example of the decoupling of compensation and control. In the privacy
debate, individual consumers and citizens care about control for its own
sake.
To make this observation concrete, consider the four rules as applied to
personal data.222 Imagine a search company, an online retailer, or a social-
networking company that wishes to collect, aggregate, and perhaps even sell
personal data. Rule One would mean that individuals could obtain an in-
junction to prevent the company from collecting or retaining those data at
all. Rule Two would mean that damages were available to individuals, but
companies willing to pay the fines could proceed in collecting, aggregating,
and selling the data and regard the fee as a cost of doing business.223 Rule
Three would mean that the companies could use the data they collect from
individuals without repercussions. Perhaps one of these rules seems appeal-
ing, but none of the approaches has yet caught on or been proven effective.
Rule Four has some attributes as a compromise that I have not seen
anyone consider in the privacy debates. The rule would give decisionmaking
authority to individuals but would require them to pay a governmentally set
fee to retrieve the data, a requirement that recognizes the investment that
online companies have made in collecting that data. The fee might be set
very low, perhaps at five or ten dollars, which would enable many citizens to
219. See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 917, 976 (2011)
(“The statutory invention registration allows inventors to publish inventions that they do not
intend to patent in a manner that precludes others from patenting the invention.”).
220. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477 (2006).
221. See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Di-
lemma, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1880, 1880, 1888–89 (2013) (describing modern issues that have
given rise to new discussions in privacy law).
222. See Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 6–7
(2011) (defining “personally identifiable information”).
223. This depends, of course, on the level of the fee f2. It does not appear that fines have
deterred companies from collecting personal data, but that is just my impression.
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pay the fee to the online companies they deal with most. And while con-
sumer advocates would certainly prefer Rule One, perhaps Rule Four repre-
sents a compromise worth putting on the table.
Conclusion
Recognizing the value of control for its own sake has important conse-
quences for academic analyses and policy resolutions of property disputes.
By relaxing a single assumption in the standard law-and-economics account
of property rules and liability rules, I have shown that having the entitle-
ment to a particular use of property is not always preferable—if the entitle-
ment will be protected only by a liability rule. Moreover, I have derived the
specific conditions under which that will be the case.
This economic analysis should give new life to the missing Rule Four. It
also suggests that the government should learn about the preferences and
values of the parties to property and intellectual property disputes, possibly
through engaging in policy experiments. I have provided some broad sug-
gestions about how Rule Four, along with the idea of decoupling compensa-
tion and control more generally, could be useful in the areas of copyright,
trademark, patent, and privacy. Future work could explore the details of
implementing such a policy in these areas, identifying both the benefits and
the pitfalls.
Certain disputes over property—such as those involving digital sam-
pling, trademark dilution, and personal data—are difficult to resolve be-
cause both sides have compelling interests. Sometimes, both parties will have
an interest in being the decisionmaker. Sometimes, both parties will seek
mainly financial rewards. But in certain cases, one party will value control
more than compensation. We should look to identify these instances and
craft policy compromises accordingly.
